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After 100 years, the Hawaiian kingdom’s collapse continues to garner not only 
academic debate, but also long-standing hostilities rooted in deep-seated sentiments of 
Pacific Nativism and American Nationalism. From this enduring conflict, two historical 
interpretations have developed that reflect the polarized views of nineteenth century 
Western capitalists and the modern Native Hawaiians. Although antagonistic in nature, 
their narratives reject accepted historical methods in favor of promoting their specific 
social, religious, and political principles. Using government documents, newspaper and 
journal articles, as well as the manuscripts of key historical agents, the thesis reexamines 
the events corresponding to the cessation of Hawaii’s monarchy and its sovereignty five 
years later. Contrary to the competing primary historical narratives, it examines the often-
ignored complex social, political, and economic factors that created a tempestuous, but 
economically profitable, relationship between the kingdom’s privileged native class and 
the elite foreign subjects. The evidence indicates the 1893 coup d'état resulted from 
multiple domestic conflicts, independent of American foreign policies, but garnered 
international attention when a rogue US diplomat aided the Caucasian insurgents. 
Furthermore, the material suggests American imperialists in 1898, not a policy of 
imperialism, used their country’s increased nationalism during the Spanish-American 





global historical narratives, remained the islands’ neglected commoners caught in the 
drive to elevate financial standings. 
1 
Introduction and Historiography: 
 
On January 15, 1993, President Bill Clinton signed United States Public Law 103-
150 that formally apologized to the Hawaiian people for the nation’s partial culpability in 
the overthrow of Queen Lydia Liliuokalani through the “participation of agents and 
citizens of the United States.”
1
 The resolution’s failure to provide the first step towards 
reconciliation among pro-sovereignty advocates in Hawaii demonstrated the continued 
relevance the United States’ acquisition of the islands preserves to this day. Not only an 
academic debate, the US actions represents a source of hostility rooted in deep-seated 
sentiments of Pacific Nativism and American nationalism. At the conflict’s heart reside 
questions whether the archipelago’s appropriation violated the islanders’ right to self-
determination and whether this act abrogated America’s founding principles. Over the 
past century, this enduring question created two conflicting historical interpretations. The 
first reflects the interpretations of the kingdom’s nineteenth century American and 
European subjects who led the coup d'état against the monarchy. As the instigators of the 
Pacific society’s collapse, their account has become a target of contemporary native 
scholars dedicated to revising what they consider a racist and misrepresentative narrative. 
The vying accounts, although antagonistic in nature, share the tendency to abandon 




                                                 
1
 Apology Resolution, United States Pub. L No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993). 
2
 Unfortunately, these represent the popular accounts concerning the events that constitute this 
pivotal moment in evolution of the two cultures. 
2 
Contrary to the competing primary historical narratives, this work examines the 
often-ignored complex social, political, and economic factors that created a tempestuous, 
but economically profitable, relationship between the kingdom’s native elite and the 
privileged Western subjects. The 1893 coup d'état resulted from multiple domestic 
conflicts, independent of American foreign policies, but garnered international attention 
when a rogue US diplomat aided the Anglo insurgents. Furthermore, the material 
suggests American imperialists in 1898, not a national strategy of imperialism, used their 
country’s increased nationalistic fervor during the Spanish-American War to appropriate 
the Hawaiian Islands as a military asset.  
The Nineteenth Century Narrative 
The pro-Western narrative concerning the transformation and later acquisition of 
Hawaii originated in the published works of the American missionaries who arrived in 
the islands in 1820. Ministers like Hiram Bingham and Rufus Anderson of the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions held strong racial prejudices encouraged 
by their conservative religious and political philosophies. Consequently, they condemned 
those who failed to convert to Christianity as sub-humans demanding of salvation or 
condemnation.
3
 The numerous books, which followed, perpetuated the Boston 
missionary’s romanticized description of their work in the Pacific.
4
 Although written 
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 The books identified in this overview represented only a few of the many published by the 
members of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission. Additional books included, 
History of the Sandwich Islands by Sheldon Dibble and Life in the Sandwich Islands: The Heart of the 
Pacific as It was and Is by Reverend Henry Cheever. Henry T. Cheever, Life in the Sandwich Islands: Or, 
3 
decades later, Rudyard Kipling’s poem, The White Man's Burden: The United States and 
The Philippine Islands reflects their sentiment towards their mission and the Hawaiians.
5
 
The men viewed themselves as agents of God and democracy, entrusted with the duty to 
civilize the brutish and barbaric Pacific islanders. Their writings became a source of 
cultural comparisons that advocated the re-socialization of the native’s characteristics, 
which denigrated the archipelago’s rich history and diminished its people integrity. From 
these works formed the foundational interpretation that influenced the official narratives 
for the next 120 years.
6
  
Between 1850 and 1890, the number of literary works regarding the kingdom 
dwindled as the American and Hawaiian populace focused upon their respective internal 
problems. However, as revolutionary sentiment increased and eventually brought about 
the society’s collapse, the islands experienced a resurgence in Western popular media. 
The initial works that originated from the former kingdom, outside newspaper or journal 
articles, represented the revolutionary doctrine that led to the uprising. William DeWitt 
Alexander’s History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 
1893 signified the first major publication concerning the coup d'état.
7
 A descendent of an 
American missionary, Alexander offered a firsthand account based upon Western 
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 Historians like Samuel Manaiakalani Kamakua, David Malo, and John Papa I`i published books 
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 William D. Alexander, History of Later Years of the Hawaiian Monarchy and the Revolution of 
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4 
perspectives, despite his attempt to “state the facts… in their true relations and in their 
just proportions.”
8
 The use of phrases like “the better class of citizens” to describe the 
American businessmen belied his alliance to the insurrectionists and their forefather’s 
commitment to Social-Darwinism.
9
 He attributed the Pacific society growth and 
increased value to Western. The author attributed the monarchy’s fall to its widespread 
corruption, incompetence, and the White community’s persecution. Their actions, he 
claimed, forced the foreign subjects to reluctantly assume a mission similar to the 1776 




Alexander’s work ironically, represented advancement in historical literature by 
shifting the focus away from the previous centuries’ providential and mythopoetic 
accounts to a patria-centric foundation that reflected the Progressive Era’s effects upon 
American society.
11
 As the United States entered into a new industrial revolution, 
scientific and political ideology overshadowed the divine as the foundation of American 
exceptionalism. Just as the Christian religion’s introduction intended to assure the 
natives’ salvation, men like Alexander considered the American-Hawaiian subject’s acts 
as a noble mission to advance the once primitive people into the modern world, albeit 
kicking and screaming. 
Twentieth Century American Discourse  
The contemporary discourse concerning the Hawaiian kingdom’s collapse echoes 
a larger international discussion that originated with its appropriation at the close of the 
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 Alexander, History of Later Years, ix. 
9
 Alexander, History of Later Years, 27. 
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 Alexander, History of Later Years, 27. 
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 Patria-centric: A historical account written to idealize a country’s history.  
5 
nineteenth century. A year and a half after the Spanish-American War, the United States 
gained control of Hawaii, the Philippines, Porta Rico, and part of Samoa, thus becoming 
a dominant power in the Pacific and the Caribbean. During the three decades that 
followed Hawaii’s acquisition, Americans who questioned the direction of US policy 
regarded the new territory as merely a symptom of a larger problem related to 
commercial and military development.
12
 The academic debates mirrored the American 
public’s divided opinions regarding foreign policy. Anti-expansionists pointed to 
incongruities between the nations democratic and imperialistic foreign policy. 
Furthermore, identifying its military lacked the infrastructure to support an empire 
especially in terms of sea power. Others maintained concerns about the threats posed by 




The pro-expansionists considered Hawaii’s strategic location required its 
annexation to facilitate operations against Spanish forces in the Pacific. For these 
individuals however, after the cessation of hostilities the archipelago provided an 
advanced defensive base to counter Asian growth and provided an instrumental port to 
supported US commerce. They declared the United States held an obligation to spread its 
political and capitalist values throughout the world; as it represented the pinnacle of a 
modern society especially in the face of incompetent Hawaiian leadership, not to mention 
the growing Japanese and Chinese influence in the Pacific region.
14
 The twentieth 
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6 
century represented a period of American exceptionalism that demanded its expansion for 
the world’s benefits. 
In 1899, popular journalist, Edmund Carpenter, published America in Hawaii: A 
History of the United States Influence in the Hawaiian Islands that chronicled the 
kingdom’s perceived advancement into the modern era.
15
 The work reflects the romantic 
views of American nationalistic apostles and their view of US interests, which advocated 
the spread of democratic ideals and capitalism throughout the world.
16
 His arguments 
represent nearly 100 years of Anglo-American intervention in Hawaii and reflected the 
strident narratives that embraced expansionism. Carpenter concludes, as did many 
annexationists, the archipelago’s appropriation remained inevitable considering the close 




Building upon Carpenter’s historical assessment, Charles Morris’ multi-volume 
historical work, The Great Republic, addresses both the patrio-centric views and the 
lingering doubts concerning American colonialism.
18
 Although he provided a quick 
acknowledgement of the anti-annexations argument that commercial and military benefits 
were present, “without annexation, as well as with it,” the book largely supports the 
expansionists’ platform.
19
 Morris states, “for many years the Hawaiian Islands (had) been 
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7 
drifting by natural law under the American flag.”
 20
 The once “semi-savages” remained 
“incapable of governing and unfit for the condition of civilization.”
21
 Through his 
assessment, Morris’ assigns the weight of the pro-expansionists’ drive to annex Hawaii to 
the need for reliable leadership to further American commercial enterprises in the Pacific. 
The “white” race, he cited Arthur C. James, should be the natural leaders in the region. 
This racial tone existed throughout the pro-Western rhetoric and over time drew 
considerable criticism from progressive minded scholars, and later contributed to the 
modern-Hawaiian narrative concerning America’s perceived objectives. 
In his 1931 essay, The United States and Hawaii during the Spanish-American 
War, Thomas Bailey questioned the pro-annexationists’ reasoning.
22
 He deduced the 
Spanish American War benefited the expansionists, rather than the nation’s security. 
Bailey stated Pearl Harbor’s importance in the annexation debates maintained little 
relevance, as the harbor lacked the needed facilities or coal to service American warships. 
He added the US Navy retained access to an effective resupply point on the island of 
Kiska, within the Aleutians to the north.
23
 The author concludes that in the absence of 




As academics debated the ethics of American foreign policy in the 1930s, the 
revolutions two primary instigators published books that chronicled the events leading to 
the uprising in Hawaii. Lorrin A. Thurston’s Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution and 
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21
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22
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8 
Sanford B. Dole’s similarly named book both created a romanticized account concerning 
their actions while vilifying the islands’ political leaders.
25
 Nearly identical to William 
Alexander’s book, Thurston and Dole shared the assertion that the monarchy lacked the 
ability or moral foundation to effectively lead their country. The revolution, they stated, 
represented the community’s moral duty in the face of tyranny and annexation to the 
United States served to further Hawaii’s growth. Prior to its commitment to paper, the 
insurrectionists’ attitudes encouraged the ideology held by Carpenter, Morris, and the 
American politicians who sought to benefit from the islands’ strategic importance. The 
revolutionaries shared rhetoric justifying the monarchy’s overthrow represents the final 
chapter to the first official narrative established by their fathers nearly a hundred years 
earlier.   
In 1936, a University of Hawaii professor and member of the Hawaiian Historical 
Society published the first, of a three-volume history dedicated to the islands. Ralph 
Kuykendall’s series reflects the established historical research methodologies of the 
period. The first volume, The Hawaiian Kingdom, 1778-1854, explores the archipelago’s 
transition from a feudal system of warring chiefs to a unified kingdom under King 
Kamehameha the Great and provides the reader an understanding of Hawaii’s 
transformation through the adoption of Western culture and governance, under King 
Kamehameha III.
26
 Twenty Critical Years, 1854-1874, the second in the succession, 
surveyed the monarchy’s often-neglected “middle period.” Kuykendall exploration drew 
critical attention to the rise of racial, political, and economic conflict, while examining 
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 Sanford B. Dole and Andrew Farrell, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution (Honolulu: 
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the United States’ changing attitudes towards the islands.
27
 The final volume, The 
Hawaiian Kingdom 1874-1893, provides an in-depth analysis concerning the Kalakaua 
Dynasty between 1874 and 1893 and Queen Lili’uokalani’s eventual overthrow.
28
 
Although his work avoids the pro-Western providential philosophy and moral 
condemnation, he fails to examine political and economic corruption prevalent on both 
sides of the political and economic divide. Unlike the previous works, the author 
remained critical towards the American-Hawaiians, but eventually concluded their 
actions remained in the best interest of the local people. Maintaining some balance, 
Kuykendall also questions the monarchy’s moral character, yet in his survey neglected to 
address the kingdom’s unique evolution to modernity and the presence of US 
expansionist groups who encouraged the 1893 revolution and the archipelago’s 1898 
cession. Despite his support of the Western agents, his works came to represent the first 
neutral narrative concerning the events surrounding Hawaii’s monarchy period.  
Two years before the posthumous publication of Ralph Kuykendall’s final 
volume, an African American historian, Merze Tate, published The United States and the 
Hawaiian Kingdom: A Political History.
29
 The author’s book continued Kuykendall’s 
shift away from the ethno-centric and patria-centric narratives through her sympathetic 
representation of the Hawaiian people and their monarchy, but did not provide new 
insight to his conclusions. Within the same decade, a second University of Hawaii 
professor, Gavan Daws wrote, Shoal of Time: A History of the Hawaiian Islands. The 
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book added to the growing impartiality towards Hawaiian history, but like Tate, fails to 
provide information worthy of renewed discussion.
30
  
Thirty years after Thomas Bailey published his essay, Thomas Osborne presented 
numerous journal articles and a historiography concerning the US acquisition of Hawaii. 
In his book entitled, “Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 
1893-1898,” the author describes a cohesive expansionist movement that benefited from 
international conflict and the anti-annexationists inability to form an effective coalition.
31
 
The archipelago, in his opinion, represented the drive of a limited, but powerful elite 
class that sought to expand their influence and open future markets to exploitation. In his 
1970 journal article, The Main Reason for Hawaiian Annexation in July 1889, Osborne 
continued his theory that commercial interests in the Pacific motivated the US 
annexationists, rather than the rhetoric for national security.
32
  
Modern historians routinely, in the aggressive re-socialization’s aftermath, often 
justifiably denounced the Anglo-Americans for their former exploits. The adoption of 
pervasive critical analysis found encouragement with the United States’ involvement in 
the Vietnam War and the consequential national debate concerning American foreign 
relations. Throughout the twentieth century, historians, scholars, and politicians revisited 
1890 American expansionist policies. From the discourse, during the 1960’s academics 
representing the political left coined the term “American Imperialism” to describe 
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11 
instances of negative US economic, military, and cultural influence upon other countries 
or its indigenous cultures. The idiom and its implementation challenged the pro-Western 
narratives established during the nineteenth century, which often ignored cultural 
relativism in favor of Anglo-American exceptionalism.
33
  
Historian William Appleman Williams’ work reflects this radical challenge to 
conservative scholars who promoted US expansionism.
34
 An advocate for the “New 
Left,” Williams represents a political and academic movement that sought to implement a 
broad range of civil and political reforms, he solidifies the term “American Imperialism.” 
The progressive historian’s “Open Door thesis” determined Secretary of State John Hay's 
Open Door Note, which proposed to keep China open to trade with all countries on an 
equal basis, served to create an informal American empire that violated the nation’s 
perceived morals.
35
 Williams also stated that despite President Grover Cleveland’s 
opposition to the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy, he supported the development of 
American influence, both commercial and diplomatic. His administration wanted the 
advantages of colonization, but not the responsibilities associated with its management.
36
  
 In contrast to Williams and the Hawaiian narrative he contributed to, the 
twentieth century American debate concerning annexation generally concluded that 
expansionist minded political and commercial groups, not the country as a whole, drove 
the nation towards an aggressive foreign policy. Hawaii represented the ongoing national 
discourse that questioned the United States’ role on the global stage and the limitations, if 
any, upon capitalism. The majority of contemporary US scholars endorsed the work of 
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Thomas Osborne and Thomas Bailey as the patria-centric narrative no longer garnered 
serious support in the light of the 1960s social and political transformation. As a result, 
the nineteenth century pro-Western narrative that promoted white supremacy and 
capitalism no longer retains historical value. Despite this fact, from the perspective of a 
twenty-first century historian, the material of the previous periods represent important 
resources for the understanding of the factors that shaped the Hawaiian monarchy.            
Twenty-First Century Hawaiian Historical Interpretation 
Empowered by the academic move to the political left and the growing civil rights 
movement, a renewed sense of nativism among the United States’ indigenous peoples 
inspired their historians to revise the pro-Western historical descriptions, which created 
negative connotations of their ancestors. Their combined works led to a complete 
reassessment of American history and the native peoples’ portrayal in academia and 
popular media. Unfortunately, in recognition of the old maxim that no good deed goes 
unpunished, numerous twentieth and twenty-first century scholars began to create a 
sweeping historical narrative that linked the negative experiences of Native Americans, 
Africans, Asians, and Pacific Islanders to the modern concept of Western imperialism. 
These accounts ignored the individual social, political, and economic characteristics of 




In Hawaii, the global narrative serves as the foundation for its growing 
sovereignty movement’s attempt to gain independence from the United States. Secession-
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minded advocates and academics portray Western-Hawaiian relations during the late 
eighteenth and nineteenth century as, “high drama, romance, heroic Native figures, 
villainous haole, and a soulless imperium-bent America consummating the relationship 
with its reluctant, even hostile bride.”
38
 The greatest source of dissatisfaction emanates 
from their cultures’ perceived suppression by American missionaries.  
If you can imagine something within your own culture that is 
tremendously important to you, that is suddenly done away with. Just 
totally ripped out and gone. If you can imagine yourself relating to 
something like that, that's what we went through... They were able to 
simply rip out the essence of that which our native soul related to. And 
cast it down and said now you relate to this, which was the new culture 
they had brought in. And if the missionaries were like Jesus Christ, it 





Much of the contemporary Hawaiian historical assessment derives from the 
foundation established from the only work that openly challenged the established 
nineteenth century Western narrative. Lydia Lili'uokalani and her 1898 book, Hawaii’s 
Story by Hawaii’s Queen provides the Western reader an understanding into the 
kingdom’s people and culture amidst aggressive foreigners. The former Queen sought to 
gain support from Americans who looked unfavorably upon the overthrow of the 
monarchy and the islands’ possible annexation to the United States. Her writings 
affirmed their sovereignty and the principles of self-government advocated in liberal 
American newspapers. For the first time in Hawaiian history, the American missionaries’ 
interventionism came into question through the favorable presentation of the indigenous 
                                                 
38
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14 
people. Unfortunately, the monarch’s memoir provided the first and last pro-Hawaiian 
narrative for nearly sixty years. 
40
  
During the 1990s, two publications established by sympathetic Americans 
reflected the developing modern-Hawaiian narrative. Rich Budnick’s Stolen Kingdom, 
and American Conspiracy and Michael Dougherty’s To Steal a Kingdom, Probing 
Hawaiian History, advocated an intentionalist historiographical interpretation related to 
the archipelagos’ appropriation at the turn of the century. They affirmed the collapse of 
the society, arguing it resulted from a scheme perpetrated by foreign merchants and 
American missionaries to assume absolute control over the islands’ rich resources.
41
 
Budnick and Dougherty challenged the established historical accounts when they asserted 
the pre-contact Pacific society maintained little discord as their social, political, and 
economic systems ensured its overall functional requisites. Despite the historical records, 
they maintained that throughout the monarchical period (1810-1893) the Hawaiians 
regarded their leadership as beloved members of society, who sustained their respect 
through their dedication to protecting the people from the “criminal capitalists.”
42
 This 
became the reoccurring theme throughout the popular contemporary narratives of 
Hawaii’s twenty-first century historians.
43
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 In the same year that Budnick and Dougherty published their books, Thurston Twigg-Smith 
disputed the native-influenced narrative in his book, Hawaiian Sovereignty: Do the Facts Matter? An 
Attempt to Untangle Revisionism. A descendant of two major players in the history of the islands, who 
15 
University of Hawaii Professor Jonathan Kay Kamakawiwo’ole Osorio’s 
Dismembering Lahui: A History of the Hawaiian Nation to 1887 provides support for 
Budnick and Dougherty’s intentionalism theory.
44
 Osorio’s work focuses upon the 
introduction of Western law to the Hawaiian civil system and its negative effects upon 
their sovereignty. His thesis asserts the American missionaries compelled the local 
leaders to adopt policies, which deteriorated the strong relationship between the islands’ 
king, his chiefs, and their subjects. The analysis suggests the Anglo immigrants’ success, 
despite their limited population, in transforming the society resulted from their 
suppression of the Hawaiian elite’s opposition. Consequently, placing the burden of 
responsibility for the political and social instability upon the Pacific kingdom’s white 




Jonathan Osorio’s colleague Noenoe Silva supported his theories through her 
examination of resistance to Western influence. Her 2004 book, Aloha Betrayed: Native 
Hawaiian Resistance to American Colonialism described a social structure that 
legitimized elite power over commoners; portraying the former chiefs as selfless 
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advocates for the rights of the people.
46
 Silva, in the process of creating a biting 
indictment of the United States’ international relations policies, understates political and 
economic divisions within the native community that existed prior to the arrival of 
Captain James Cook or American missionaries. Although her work draws critical 
attention to the tension evident in Hawaiian society regarding cultural suppression, like 
Osorio, her research appears politically biased as she concludes her book, “We Kanaka 
Maoli have now suffered more than one hundred years of nearly total US hegemony: of 




The subsequent chapters reexamine the events corresponding to the cessation of 
Hawaii’s monarchy and its sovereignty five years later. This assessment of Hawaiian 
history offers a synthesis built from the previous nineteenth century works and the 
contemporary Hawaiian revisions. Using government documents, personal accounts, and 
newspapers as well as accredited secondary sources a new interpretation is offered that 
draws attention to the complicated relationship that formed between the Hawaiian social 
and political elite, its Anglo subjects, and the United States government. As this author 
maintains the Hawaiian common class retained little influence upon the kingdom’s 
progress, their accounts are not included.    
Chapter one explores the seventy-four years that constitute the monarchy’s 
formation and its developing relationship with the maritime powers of the United States, 
Great Britain, and France. This period provides an understanding of the dramatic 
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transformations that resulted from the adoption of Western cultural practices at the 
expense of long established Hawaiian norms. As such, it offers critical insight the racial, 
social, political, and economic conflicts created the turbulent, but mutually profitable 
relationship between the Hawaiian elite and the kingdom’s Euro-American families. 
Concurrently, the section explores the association between the United States and the 
Pacific nation through a review of the multiple failed commercial treaties and annexation 
attempts. 
The second chapter analyzes the reign of David Kalakaua and the American-
Hawaiian subjects’ first revolutionary act against the monarchy in 1887. Although the 
final and most divisive uprising occurred under Queen Lydia Liliuokalani in 1893, the 
events related more to her predecessor rule rather than her own policies. The king’s 
corrupt cabinet and the former missionaries’ racial intolerance towards the Hawaiians and 
the growing number of Asian immigrants created the perfect storm in a society already 
suffering under the division between the political and economic systems critical to a 
civilization’s survival. This section also explores the indifferences exhibited by the 
United States government concerning the kingdom’s increasing instability. At the same 
time, it provides insight into the limited influence of American Expansionism.   
Chapter three examines the reign of Queen Lydia Lili’uokalani and the final 
uprising that facilitated the political and social collapse of the system. It also explores the 
extent to which the United States may have influenced the revolution, especially through 
the actions of its foreign minister to Hawaii and the captain of the USS Boston. In this 
section, and the next, along with the identification of the key players and their 
18 
motivations become critical to gaining clear understanding as to who owns responsibility 
for the kingdoms’ demise. 
The fourth chapter scrutinizes the American evolving responses to the revolution 
and it relation to the eventual appropriation of the Hawaii by the United States. Because 
the former kingdom’s political and social circumstances remain consistent after 1893, its 
story becomes less relevant compared to the grand debate regarding the future role of US 
interests on the global stage. The section examines the American public’s opinions, the 
economic issues, in addition the responses by Presidents Benjamin Harrison, Grover 
Cleveland, and William McKinley. It also studies the effects of the Spanish-American 
War in relation to the question of US expansionism beyond its continental borders and 
how it provided the annexationists with the opportunity to find victory despite decades of 
opposition. 
The two primary interpretations, which contribute to the modern debate 
concerning Hawaii’s lost sovereignty, remain flawed as the narratives are intentionally 
incomplete and ripe with political passion. Each version of the Hawaii’s monarchal 
period advocates for a particular social and political ideology that ignores the need for 
cultural relevance and the normal effects of cultural diffusion. Although no historian is 
truly neutral in their work, they are obligated through ethical and professional standards 
to provide their readers with the most accurate representation of history as possible. To 
ignore that responsibility is to purposely create chaos in the understanding of the past, 
and its value as a lesson to future generations. The ongoing discourse between the United 
States and its two indigenous populations, the Hawaiians and the Native Americans, 




In the Beginning: The Kamehameha Line of Monarchs and the Lunalilo 
Sovereignty 
 
The period between 1778 and 1874, witnessed the foundation of the Hawaiian 
Kingdom’s relationship with the Western nations. The early-Western narrative asserts 
that these critical years began in 1820 with the Boston missionaries’ arrival. The accounts 
suggest that their work found support among the Hawaiian people as did their transition 
from pious evangelicals to the islands’ powerful economic leaders. For authors like Rich 
Budnick and Stephen Kinzer, who characterize the modern native narrative, the process 
of imperialism began with Captain James Cook’s arrival in 1778.
1
 They maintain the 
United States methodically undermined the kingdom’s leadership with the ultimate goal 
of gaining complete control over the archipelago. In actuality, the United States appeared 
apathetic towards the islands until the 1840s when Great Britain and France 
unsuccessfully exerted military force to attain predominant influence with the monarchy. 
Despite the evangelical’s limited numbers and opposition from Anglo merchants, the 
royal family provided the radical Christians the opportunity to change Hawaii’s social 
and political landscape in favor of their own Western civil construct.
2
  
For the maritime powers of France and Great Britain, contact with the Hawaiian 
Islands coincided with a time of disarray in Europe and the Americas.
3
 The American and 
French Revolution forced the great empires to ignore the newly discovered Pacific region 
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in favor of their existing possessions.
4
 As Western governments remained preoccupied 
with their own struggles, Anglo-American merchants found inspiration from the 1784 
publication of James Cook’s voyages.
5
 The book hinted at the isles’ strategic position 
within the vast ocean and its potential to increase wealth through the growing Chinese 
market.
6
 While the initial introduction represented the two cultures random meeting 
through exploration, the merchants encouraged reciprocal trade and social exchange.
7
   
By 1788, commercial ships made regular stops to replenish their provisions and 
extend their operations, in addition to their profits, in exchange for clothing, metal, and 
occasionally guns.
8
 Ali’i, or chiefs, like Kamehameha recognized both the tactical and 
strategic advantage of sustaining good relations with the foreigners and he rapidly 
mastered the art of bartering, thus improving his standing among the traders (See Picture 
1).
9
 The low-ranking chief’s transactions provided his warriors access to an arsenal of 
firearms that facilitated his rapid expansion throughout the neighboring islands and by 
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1810, the eight major isles’ ali’i acknowledged his authority as Hawaii’s first absolute 
sovereign (See Picture 2).
10
  
After forty years of cultural diffusion encouraged by King Kamehameha and his 
favorite wife, Ka’ahumanu, the established Hawaiian social system neared its eventual 
collapse (See Picture 3).
11
 The rapid transformation from a system of power based upon 
multiple warring chiefs, to the rule of one, in conjunction with the weakened civil 
religion, disrupted the delicate social structure.
12
 Although the Native-Hawaiians 
maintained political control over their kingdom, the privileged classes’ enchantment with 
Western popular culture caused the traditionalists to become outsiders within their own 
nation.
13
 For the royal families who embraced Anglo-American culture, their only 
exposure involved a unique sub-culture, if not a counter-culture, of merchantmen, sailors, 
and whaling men. Impressed by their technology and material wealth the ali’i identified 
the foreigners as the reference group for the popular lifestyle they aspired to adopt.
14
  
In spite its developing economic value, the kingdom’s exposure to the European 
empires and the United States of America remained limited to sea-faring entrepreneurs.
15
 
The Napoleonic Wars and the War of 1812 added to the distractions that deterred 
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maritime powers from expanding their political interests into the Pacific Ocean.
16
 By 
1819, however, the termination of open hostilities between the governments allowed the 
powers to look towards the east as China, Japan, and India promised economic growth 
and territorial expansion. Consequently, by the start of the nineteenth century’s second 
decade Hawaii’s strategic location gained their interest as a key port.  
If King Kamehameha I signified waning ancient traditions, his death, and 
Ka’ahumanu’s rise signified their termination. On May 8, 1819, Hawaii’s first monarch 
died and his reign passed on to Ka' lani Kua-Liholiho, who assumed the title 
Kamehameha II. Whether to protect the monarchy or to pursue her own personal 
ambitions, as the young monarch lacked the ali’i nui’s respect, Ka’ahumanu challenged 
the strict cultural gender restrictions and declared herself as queen regent.
17
 Two months 
after her rise to power, she abolished the strict cultural norms governing gender, which in 
turn, rendered the religious laws meaningless and brought about the religious system’s 
collapse.
18
   
Months after Ka’ahumanu’s actions created a spiritual and cultural vacuum in her 
society, representatives from the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions set sail from Boston, Massachusetts, to Hawaii.
19
 Inspired by the Second Great 
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Awakening, the organization formed, “for the purpose of devising ways and means, and 
adopting and prosecuting measures, for promoting the spread of the gospel in heathen 
lands.”
20
 Upon the missionaries’ appearance, the archipelago’s ali’i mistakenly 
anticipated the continuation of the reciprocal respect they shared with the merchants. The 
new arrivals’ fundamentalist views, however, encouraged an extremely conservative 
system that allowed little room for individuality.
21
 Consequently, the former relationship 
the Hawaiians enjoyed became all but impossible as the ministers’ mission to propagate 
the gospel prevented cultural relativism (See Picture 4).
22
 Through their selective 
perception, they determined the indigenous people existed in a realm “of darkness, as 
darkness itself; and of the shadow of death without order, and where the light is as 
darkness.”
 23
 Their existing intolerance viewed Kamehameha the Great’s death and the 
resulting termination of the long established spiritual system by Ka’ahumanu as a gift 
from their Judeo-Christian God.
24
  
In 1824, King Kamehameha II traveled to London to resubmit a formal request to 
establish Hawaii as a protectorate under the empire, but during the visit, he succumbed to 
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 On May 6, 1825, the HMS Blonde arrived in the islands to return the king’s 
body and to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Hawaiian Kingdom.
26
 The 
pledge of friendship represented the first official diplomatic correspondence between the 
new monarchy and the maritime powers. A year later, the US Navy’s Pacific Squadron’s 
Commodore Isaac Hull dispatched Thomas Catesby Jones and the USS Peacock to 
conduct a “friendly inspection” of Hawaii.
27
 On December 23, 1826, Captain Jones 
negotiated a commerce treaty with Queen Ka’ahumanu, but the treaty never received 
ratification by the United States Congress, as Jones lacked the authority to establish 
formal diplomatic relations. The document, however, formed the legal foundation of the 
two countries’ relations for several decades.
28
  
With Liholiho’s death, eleven-year-old Kauikeaouli assumed the title of King 
Kamehameha III, and like his brother shared the monarchy with Elizabeth Kaʻahumanu 
(See Picture 5).
29
 Because of England’s unwillingness to assimilate Hawaii as its 
protectorate, despite the regent’s request, the responsibility fell upon the native rulers to 
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create their kingdom’s new guiding principles.
30
 She adopted European civil and 
religious edicts, which challenged the popular culture encouraged by the merchants and 
sailors.
31
 In response, they and numerous Hawaiians rebelled against the shifting 
influences. The regent, the missionaries, and their advocates among the native people 
suppressed the violent civil conflict and established a permanent conservative social 
order throughout the islands.
32
 
After Kamehameha III’s full assumption of the throne after the Ka’ahumanu’s 
death on June 5, 1832, a series of foreign relation blunders occurred, which hastened 
America’s political favor among the Hawaiian leadership.
33
 Between July 9, 1839, and 
November 11, 1843, the French and British exercised military actions against the 
Hawaiian Kingdom.
34
 In each event, the United States provided political support for the 
weak monarchy and ensuring its commitment to the country’s independence. Soon after 
the hostilities’ ceased, France and England signed official treaties to honor the Hawaiian 
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 The United States refused to participate, as it wanted to 
avoid establishing political alliances with their formal rivals.
36
 Despite the absence of an 
official treaty, the US stated the “Tyler Doctrine” confirmed their pledge to Hawaii’s 
autonomy and thus negated the requirement of an official document.
37
 By the 1840s, the 
kingdom’s sovereignty remained protected through the maritime powers mutual jealousy, 




As the monarchy realized its increasing value among the nations of the west, 
Kamehameha III and his Chief Council looked towards the missionaries and other 
respected foreign residents for guidance in modifying its political, legal, and economic 
systems.
39
 Based upon their suggestions, on October 8, 1840, the king and his council 
formed a parliamentary monarchy based upon England’s government.
40
 The legislative 
body consisted of two branches, a House of Representatives that served the common 
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people and the House of Lords that encompassed the council of chiefs and the king.
41
 In 
the absence of Western educated Hawaiians, Kamehameha III appointed foreigners 




The Hawaiian government and economy remained under the native leaders’ 
direction until 1845, but as the decade closed, the power dynamic in the islands 
experienced numerous transformations.
43
 Through a series of land reform bills, the king, 
guided by the prominent American missionaries, opened the sections of land to the 
island’s commoners and select foreigners.
44
 The 1845 Great Mahele, established a Land 
Commission and Court of Claims to administer the divisions, but due in part to different 
cultural notions of property, the kanaka’s claims were never established, allowing 
numerous foreigners to acquire large tracts.
45
 The new agencies concluded the feudal 
relationship between the ali’i and the commoners as the ultimate authority emanated from 
an unfamiliar legal system that few Hawaiians understood. The newly established 
officers, all of whom were of Western descent and maintained interests in the Hawaiian 
economy, replaced the chiefs as the king’s intermediaries.
46
 Islanders expressed their 
anxieties regarding the king’s policies, as many feared that the continued Westernization 
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of their society risked their sovereignty.
47
 They also maintained concerns that if 
foreigners became entrenched in the archipelago’s institutions, their influence could 
never be realistically reversed.
48
 Despite their concerns, Kamehameha III continued to 
pursue the Anglo-Americans’ guidance and by the end of the 1840s, he empowered 
foreigners with the privileges of a subject. These individuals, along with those who 
followed, maintained dual citizenship with their countries of origin, and as a result, 
sustained no true loyalty to the Hawaiian Kingdom.
49
 
On August 24, 1850, both the Hawaiian Kingdom and the United States ratified a 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.
50
 It marked a turning point in Hawaii’s 
economic future as the demand for coffee, sugar, and other goods during the California 
Gold Rush created increased profits for the numerous local plantations (See Picture 6 and 
7).
51
 As the new businesses promised lucrative futures, the evangelists who once pledged 
to forsake personal gain to honor God’s glory, abandoned their oaths to become Hawaiian 
capitalists.
52
 As the foreigners, or haole as the Hawaiians referred to them, discarded 
from their spiritual mission, the superordinate goal of forming a pluralistic society grew 
more distant.
53
 The motivation of profit and their prevailing xenophobic values only 
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During 1850, France resumed its aggressive program against Hawaii to gain 
favorable trade considerations.
55
 In desperation, on March 11, 1851, after meetings in 
France failed to reach a favorable resolution, the king's ministers provided Luther 
Severance, the Commissioner of the United States in Honolulu, a deed of cession. The 
document requested the Americans annex Hawaii until the satisfactory conclusion of 
hostilities.
56
 In response, United States Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, directed the 
navy to enhance its presence in the Pacific Ocean to deter further French aggression.
57
 In 
a confidential dispatch of the same date, Severance received directions to return the deed 
to the kingdom as an American pledge to its independence.
58
 The fear of supplementary 
French aggression prompted Kamehameha III, as a failsafe, to increase his ties with the 
United States. To this end, President Franklin Pierce’s Secretary of State William L. 
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Both proposals received strong opposition from southern American sugar 
plantations who saw the treaty as a threat to their profits.
60
 British and French consuls to 
the islands also protested the strict alliances with the United States violated international 
treaties and warranted possible military responses in the preservation of their national 
interests in the Sandwich Isles. Overwhelmed with domestic racial, political, and 
geographic conflicts, US officials placed the annexation discussions on hold.
61
 Any hope 
for the two proposals’ immediate resurrection ended with Kamehameha III’s death on 
December 15, 1854, along with the successful exercise of foreign influence.
62
  
The subsequent reigns of ʻIolani Liholiho Keawenui (King Kamehameha IV) and 
Lot Kapuāiwa (King Kamehameha V) strained the relationship between the kingdom’s 
Western subjects and the Hawaiian people.
63
 It emanated from the brothers’ concern that 
the growing white elite social class posed a threat to the monarchy’s power and 
eventually the people’s sovereignty. To strengthen the Native-Hawaiian’s unity, the kings 
encouraged a cultural renaissance to revive the traditional practices suppressed under 
Ka’ahumanu’s reign.
64
 Their distrust of the Americans developed from a negative 
encounter they experienced with racism in Washington, DC. While the princes rode in 
their official train car, a conductor forcibly removed them because of their skin color.
65
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The future Hawaiian kings lost faith in the America’s civil equality rhetoric and their 
promises to honor Hawaii’s right to self-determination.
66
  
Their resistance to foreign influence coincided with a growing movement in 
America that advocated expanding the country’s sphere of influence beyond its 
continental boundaries.
67
 Although they constituted a minority of the US population, their 
ideology encouraged the American-Hawaiian subjects to pressure the United States to 
explore the island’s annexation. The movement’s leaders, consisting of primarily 
Republicans, noted that men of foreign birth or heritage ran a large majority of the 
Hawaii’s offices. Their concern, they reported, was that US influence was waning and 
required immediate action to avoid the kingdom’s loss.
68
  
During Kamehameha V’s reign the American Civil War provided the kingdom 
increased financial access to the United States’ markets.
69
 The demand for sugar, wool, 
and rice after the loss of southern agriculture forced the embattled Federal government to 
turn the islands’ plantations. As the economic leaders, the surge in trade solidified the 
former missionaries place within Hawaiian society. The businessmen, unfortunately, 
failed to consider the newfound prosperity as product of the country, but rather the 
consequence of their own ability and racial superiority. Their ethnocentric attitudes and 
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Hawaii’s social, political, and economic fragility became apparent with the 
American agricultural markets’ reunification that created an abundance of sugar.
71
 By 
1866, the steep drop in prices triggered a critical economic depression in the islands.
72
 In 
the face of their declining influence and the industry’s potential collapse, the American-
Hawaiian businessmen formed an organization to challenge what they perceived as a 
native movement against the white community’s right to property and unlimited profit.
73
 
The majority of the members included former missionaries who gained a critical place 
within the monarchy under Queen Ka’ahumanu and Kamehameha III. Their strong 
prejudice against the kanaka encouraged the belief the ruling family constituted a “mere 
shell” and the islanders’ independence was a gift from the white landowners.
74
 As full 
subjects of the crown, the “Missionary Boys,” as they called themselves, maintained the 
opinion they held the right to speak freely for the indigenous people despite their 
American or European heritages. This perceived justification to interfere in the 
kingdom’s sovereignty extended to the point of advocating its transfer under another 
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 To that end, the organization entered into negotiations with the United States’ 




Agriculture served as the “life of the nation, not only from its profitable returns, 
but as tending directly to the increase of the population, and the prolongation of vigorous 
life.”
77
 Although, the natives controlled the political system, the haoles directed the 
economy. The removal of one group from their position of power risked the social 
scheme’s delicate balance and thus the Hawaiian Kingdom’s collapse. As a result, 
Hawaii’s future remained torn between two completely separate ideologies without the 
possibility for compromise. 
In acknowledgement of Hawaii’s dire economic state, Kamehameha V 
encouraged a renewed attempt to establish a Hawaiian-American reciprocity treaty. The 
negotiations encountered repeated resistance as they failed to garner support within both 
countries.
78
 The greatest threat to the treaty, ironically, emanated from the same men that 
promised to benefit from its success, the American-Hawaiian businessmen.
79
 For these 
individuals, it represented a seven-year reprieve from the American duties where 
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annexation to the US represented a permanent solution and promised to end Hawaiian 
opposition that continued to threatened their profits and power.
80
 Despite the loud calls 
for annexation among the islands’ haoles and American expansionists, it lacked popular 
support among Hawaii subjects and American citizens. The Hawaiian Club of Boston, an 
organization that promoted the kingdom’s businesses, noted there was little support for 
annexation from the American public, especially if obtained through force.
81
 This 
realization compelled Secretary of State William H. Seward to concede that, “American 
sensibly continues to be fastened upon the domestic questions… The public mind refuses 
to dismiss these questions even so far to entertain the higher, but more remote question of 
national expansion and aggrandizement.”
82
  
On December 11, 1872, the Kamehameha family’s line passed from existence 
with the monarch’s death on his forty-second birthday. Without a declared successor, the 
Kingdom of Hawaiian turned to the electoral process to determine its next ruler. On 
January 8, 1873, the Hawaiian legislature unanimously voted William Lunalilo to assume 
the throne (See Picture 5).
83
 As the new king welcomed the “missionary influence,” the 
tides of Hawaii’s political and traditional values shifted once again.
84
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Like his predecessors, Lunalilo continued to advocate for a treaty of reciprocity 
with the United States in hopes of ending the debilitating depression.
85
 To exploit the 
archipelago’s desperate economic situation, the American government added a quid pro 
quo modification to the negotiation that called for the monarchy to allow the US to lease 
O’ahu’s Pearl Harbor for fifty years.
86
 Because the treaty appeared as the saving grace for 
the Missionary Boys, who remained overly dependent on the American market, 
approximately thirty Anglo-American subjects, without Hawaiian representation, 
attended a meeting with US officials in Washington, DC.
87
 Although President Ulysses S. 
Grant supported US expansionism, he refused to entertain ideas of military intervention.
88
 
His administration informed the envoys that unless the Hawaiian monarchy requested 
annexation, they needed to induce the people to overthrow their government to establish a 
new republic willing to facilitate a formal request for annexation.
89
 The treaty never 
found the support it required as the king altered his position upon receiving 
overwhelming opposition from the Hawaiian public, but the president’s statement served 
as a revolutionary blue print for the annexationists.
90
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On February 3, 1874, Lunalilo died from complications brought on by 
tuberculosis and alcoholism.
91
 In his wake, the divide between Hawaii’s rulers and the 
haole businessmen became increasingly complicated as the older generation gradually 
departed from positions of government and commercial leadership.
92
 In their place 
entered natural born subjects who represented full-blooded Hawaiians, persons of 
complete Caucasian descent, and individuals of mixed Hawaiian-Caucasian birth 
educated in government service and commerce. More so then before, the contemporary 
local leaders blurred the line between who constituted a native or foreigner and who held 
the legal right to determine the Pacific nation’s future.
93
  
The new generation formed two opposing groups whose ideologies encouraged 
the social and political manifestation of deep seeded racial tensions.
94
 Men who 
maintained full or partial Hawaiian genealogy generally populated the Hawaiian 
legislature and sought to ensure the indigenous people’s sovereignty through the 
restriction, if not removal, of haole involvement in government offices. Males with 
strong family and commercial ties to the United States largely represented the Missionary 
Party and its desire to unseat the monarchy or pass the kingdom’s administration to the 
US. Like their fathers, they commanded the economy and perceived the kanaka attempts 
to retain control as an indication of a growing anti-white movement that threatened their 
lives and property.
95
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The era proceeding King David Kalakaua’s reign and the Hawaiian monarchy’s 
eventual collapse, under his sister Queen Lydia Liliuokalani, provided evidence as to 
Hawaii’s complexity. Unlike the historical narratives of many Native-American and 
African tribes, the Hawaiian Islands benefited from the normally aggressive Anglo-
American governments’ indifference. This allowed Kamehameha the Great, 
Ka’ahumanu, and Kamehameha III to exercise their right to self-determination as the 
presence of Westerners in the Pacific increased. Initially a rapport based upon reciprocal 
trade encouraged the normal effects of cultural diffusion between the two societies, but 
after 1820 the relationship transformed into one of aggressive re-socialization as the 
American missionaries worked to suppress the ancient culture in favor of their own 
radical religious construct. The Hawaiian elite, captivated by foreign material wealth 
aggressively encouraged the adoption of Western cultural norms before and long after the 
Boston evangelicals’ arrival to facilitate the growth of Hawaii as an economic power in 
the Pacific. Independent of the American government and in violation of the American 
Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions mandate, the missionaries used their 
developing influence among the inexperienced native leadership to incorporate 
themselves into the islands’ upper class. By the time the Hawaiian monarchy realized the 
danger their Western subjects posed to the kingdom’s sovereignty, the haole 
businessmen’s role in the islands’ success proved too critical to risk their removal. 
Because the United States government continued to lack the desire to assume 
responsibility for a new territory, the conflict remained domestic in nature. As the new 
monarchy approached, the animosity among the islands multi-racial community planted 






King David Kalākaua and the Bayonet Constitution 
 
The reign of King David Kalākaua revealed the Hawaiian political system’s 
weaknesses and the former missionaries’ increased influence. It also demonstrated the 
contempt the privileged Caucasian class maintained regarding the native people’s desire 
to regain a sense of identity. Unfortunately, at a time that demanded competent 
leadership, the king exasperated the tensions. The monarch’s solicitation of support from 
both sides of the islands’ racial divide and his eventual betrayals, created an environment 
conducive to rebellion. In the chaos, the former missionaries manipulated the liberties 
they gained through the previous leaders to undermine the kingdom, at the native 
people’s expense.    
With King Alexander Lunalilo’s passing, and no assigned heir to the throne, the 
1874 election called attention to the newly formed ethno-political organizations inspired 
by the social, cultural, and economic shifts of the previous twenty years. The two 
candidates, Queen Emma Rooke and Colonel David Kalākaua, served as evidence of 
growing racial tensions in the islands. Both contenders descended from families of 
distinction among the former chiefs and possessed Western educations. Their previous 
roles in the kingdom’s governance indicated that they were fully capable of leadership.
1
 
As advocates for the “Hawaii for Hawaiians” movement during the previous election and 
throughout Lunalilo’s rule, their rhetoric opposed the missionary party’s annexationist 
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policies. Each embodied the promise of Hawaii’s increased independence from the 
United States and the return of its suppressed culture.
2
 
The former wife of Kamehameha IV, Queen Emma remained the most popular of 
the electorate, especially on Oahu, the capital island. Her close ties to the people and the 
respect she garnered among the foreign diplomats garnered her great support, but her 
strong alliances with Great Britain created concern among the haole subjects dependent 
upon the US commercial markets.
3
 Despite his heritage and his government service, her 
opponent failed to maintain the same respect.
4
 David Kalākaua’s fall from the kanaka 
began as Lunalilo neared his death. Despite his pro-sovereignty rhetoric and numerous 
attacks against Lunalilo for siding with the foreigners, he submitted a letter to the Pacific 
Commercial Advertiser that indicated he maintained no animosity against the Missionary 
Boys and their supporters. He further stated that although he questioned the policies 
related to Pearl Harbor’s lease to the United States, he never lost faith in the US 
government’s good intentions.
5
 The candidate showed additional signs of conciliation 
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Faced with the prospect of choosing the lesser of two perceived evils, the Euro-
American subjects placed their backing and money on David Kalākaua and provided him 
the edge he needed to overcome Queen Emma.
7
 On February 12, 1874, the legislature 
elected Kalākaua (See Picture 8).
8
 Upon the announcement, Emma’s supporters rioted 
outside the legislature and attacked the representatives who voted against her. Without an 
established professional army to respond, American and British military vessels deployed 
troops throughout the city of Honolulu to quell the uprising. When the demonstrators 
disbanded and the threat of additional public demonstrations ended, the troops returned to 
their ships.
9
 The next day the former queen congratulated her opponent and directed her 
supporters to respect the election’s outcome.
10
 The events of that February day caused the 
kanaka to believe the American-Hawaiians’ influence continued to sway their legislature 
and their monarch symbolized that power.
11
  
In November 1874, David Kalākaua moved further away from the Native 
Hawaiians when he traveled to Washington, DC, to personally advocate for a reciprocal 
trade accord and repair the frail relationship between the two countries.
12
 Eager to obtain 
Pearl Harbor and revive their influence in the region, President Ulysses S. Grant and 
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish extended the monarch every privilege throughout his 
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 Upon his return, he informed his subjects the treaty promised to increase the 
islands’ wealth and demonstrated Hawaii deserved its independence. He warned the 
people that for the country to survive, it could not return to its lost heritage while the 
world around it advanced into the modern age. Its success, Kalākaua declared, relied 
upon the west’s material culture and their ability to accept Western culture.
14
   
The largest opposition to the treaty in the United States originated from the 
domestic sugar industries. As before, they perceived the accord provided the foreign 
nation with an unfair advantage that held the potential of reducing the domestic growers’ 
revenue.
15
 To reduce the resistance, the two countries agreed to limit Hawaii’s 
exportation of refined sugar. The new commercial arrangement called for the Pacific 
plantations to ship their unprocessed sugar to San Francisco refineries. Under the 
agreement, the islands’ sugar producers continued to gain a profit, while the US west 
coast companies maintained their control of the processed product. The compromise 
reduced the strength of the Refiners and Planters Lobby to only the southern states, which 
allowed the treaty to gain ratification on September 9, 1876.
16
 
The most important stipulation, which forever changed the United States’ role in 
the archipelago, existed in the treaty’ fifth article. It declared that, “so long as this treaty 
shall remain in force, he (the monarch) will not lease or otherwise dispose of or create 
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any lien upon any port, harbor, or other territory in his dominions, or grant so special 
privilege or right of use therein, to any other power, state, or government.”
17
 Because of 
the Pearl Harbor proviso, the reciprocity accord represented more than an economic or 
commercial agreement, as it maintained strong political consequences for both countries. 
Kalākaua and the Hawaiian legislature’s support facilitated the United States’ monopoly 
over the archipelago’s economy by closely aligning itself with the sugar trade. With the 
swipe of a pen, Washington, DC not only regained, but also multiplied its influence at the 
expense of the competing European powers, in particular Great Britain. Because England 
acted as the maritime counter-balance to the US, the monarchy’s actions increased the 
kingdom’s political and commercial isolation.
18
  
During the last half of the 1870s, the increased commercial ties between the two 
countries attracted numerous entrepreneurs who hoped to capitalize from the islands’ 
sugar trade. One such American businessman from San Francisco, Claus Spreckels, 
gained the established plantation owners’ resentment for the financial sway he 
maintained over the king.
19
 To protect his relationship with Spreckels amidst the growing 
criticism, the monarch dismissed his royal cabinet over the legislature and public’s 
objections.
20
 The controversial relationship with Spreckels represented the official break 
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between Kalākaua and the haole community. In 1880, he again came under scrutiny for 
his questionable association with another foreign businessman named Celso Caesar 
Moreno.
21
 Under Moreno’s guidance, the monarch encouraged the legislature to 
authorize a ten-million dollar loan through the Chinese government.
22
 Native leaders, 
including Queen Dowager Emma and her supporters, as well as the Missionary Party’s 
members condemned the alliance.
23
 US Minister Comly, shared their concerns in an 
official statement that displayed his frustrations, but also served to demean the pro-
sovereignty representatives.  
If this cabinet represents anything it represents what is just beginning to be 
called here the young Hawaiian party - embodying a Hawaiian know 
nothing sentiment of opposition to the foreign influence in the 
government. It suits the extreme native organization, and is looked upon 
with apprehension and dread by the foreigners who do business and pay 




Under the controversial partnership, the king and Celso Moreno introduced three 
key bills before the legislature. The proposals related to the authorization of opium-
licenses and the sale of liquor to kanaka received mixed responses in and outside the 
government, but the measure to provide Moreno's Trans Pacific Cable Company a 
$1,000,000 bonus brought widespread anger throughout the populace.
25
 In August 1880, 
the legislature voted down the bills. Walter Gibson, as the king’s supporter, responded to 
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the loss with a motion of "want of confidence," which, after a lengthy debate, failed by a 
vote of 32 to 10. However, on August 14, the king dismissed his ministers and appointed 
a new privy council with Moreno as its premier. Despite Kalākaua’s attempt to promote 
him as a man who sought to return the archipelago to the native people, he conceded to 
the masses and on the September 19, 1880, Moreno resigned.
26
  
On January 20, 1881, David Kalākaua embarked on an extended world tour of the 
major Asian and European powers.
27
 Upon his return nine months later, he perused 
strengthening relations with Great Britain, Japan, China, and Australia.
28
 The king also 
displayed a new appetite for personal aggrandizement as he envisioned his nation 
obtaining the riches and influence similar to England and the Asian empires. Kalākaua 
sustained the belief that he could unite the Pacific islands under his leadership. 
Unfortunately, his new goal undermined the rocky relationship he maintained with the 




As in the past, the Missionary Party turned to the American minister to express its 
grievances and seek his help. James Comly relayed their concerns to James G. Blaine, 
President James A. Garfield’s secretary of state.
30
 On June 30, 1881, Blaine stated the 
new administration’s policy served to ensure its support of the Hawaiian government “in 
the faithful discharge of its treaty obligations,” but it maintained a compulsion to protect 
its interests at all cost, despite France or Great Britain’s claims.
31
 Six months later, the 
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secretary restated his policy and added the Hawaiian Islands remained the “key to the 
dominion of the American Pacific, and as such the US demands their benevolent 
neutrality.”
32
 In the event that the monarchy moved from a place of neutrality, he stated, 
the “Government would then unhesitatingly meet the altered situation by seeking an 
avowedly American solution.”
33
     
The growing unrest in the islands brought concern to the next American president, 
Chester Arthur. In September 1882, his minister to Hawaii, Roland M. Daggett, assessed 
the four assemblages that opposed the king and his ministry. The first group he identified 
involved the kanaka who favored Queen Emma. He stated the group failed to pose a 
threat to the monarchy as the natives no longer represented a controlling physical force in 
the kingdom.
34
 The next population included Americans who once served as government 
officials and were willing to accept profitable public positions held by others. This class 




The final two groups he identified marked the opposition’s strength. The zealous 
and outspoken annexationist movements numbered around 400. The majority of the 
members favored the reciprocity treaty’s retraction, in favor of annexation. The most 
powerful challenge to Kalākaua involved the Anglo-American property owners. Their 
opposition however, questioned the kingdom’s administration rather than the current 
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form of government. They charged the king with extravagance and the ministry with 
failing to curb its growth.
36
 
With Moreno's departure, Walter Gibson’s devotion to Kalākaua placed him at 
the king’s right hand as his Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
37
 Despite his 
American nationality, his appointment angered the businessmen. Gibson claimed he 
understood the Hawaiian’s grievances and supported the monarch’s wish to restore the 
crown’s lost power through the revival of nativism. However, the elite class viewed the 
king’s new ally as an opportunist who desired to accumulate as much power within the 
islands as possible.
38
 In 1882, government expenditures drew concern from all sides of 
the political spectrum, but failed to garner resistance within the legislature.
39
 The greatest 
expenditures derived from the monarchy’s desire reinvent itself with the commission of a 
new palace, the creation of a standing military force, and an official coronation to 
reestablish his reign.
40
 During the following two years, the national debt rose from 
$299,200 in March 31, 1882, to $898,800 by April 1, 1884, and thirty days thereafter it 
reached a total $1,048,800.
41
  
The coronation on February 12, 1883, further revealed the discontent between the 
king, the native Hawaiian populace, and the Western subjects. Critics stated the 
ceremonies constituted an unnecessary expenditure after three years of rule and served 
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only to satisfy his vanity at the taxpayers’ expense.
42
 In an attempt to draw the kanaka’s 
support, the two-week long celebration embraced the return of old traditions first 
resurrected under Kamehameha V.
43
 The former missionaries considered the resurrection 
of beliefs their families labored to remove as a “retrograde step of heathenism and a 
disgrace to the age.”
44
 Kalākaua’s coronation and the debt’s it incurred ended any 
semblance of balance between the political and economic systems within the kingdom.  
By October 1883, the nation approached bankruptcy, but found salvation from a 
last minute injection of money by Claus Spreckels.
45
 The demands placed upon the 
business community by the legislature’s unchecked spending threatened commercial 
profits through increased taxation.
46
 The haole questioned their lack of representation in a 
government they perceived survived off their success. The American-Hawaiian subject’s 
sentiments regarding the monarch’s disregard towards their value within the kingdom 
maintained some ethical legitimacy. Their xenophobic philosophies, however, negated 
much of their argument as they failed to accept the leadership of a king and the 
legitimacy of the Hawaiian people as a whole. For men like Lorrin A. Thurston and 
Stanford Dole, the money from the plantations belonged to the white community alone 
and their property represented the United States, not the country from which it resided 
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 To protect their interests, the economic leaders established a reform 
movement that sought to increase their influence within the legislature.  
Throughout 1884, the discord between the economic and political leadership 
intensified. In an attempt to demonstrate his break from the businessmen, David 
Kalākaua rejected the United States’ exclusive right to Pearl River Harbor as a condition 
for the 1875 Reciprocity Treaty’s reinstatement.
 
His threats corresponded with opposition 
to the accord’s renewal in the US, which heightened the debate over the power of the 
islands’ currency.
48
 On June 16, the finance committee released a report that revealed 
gross negligence in government spending, but a move to remove the cabinet floundered.
49
 
As the financial picture worsened, the haole Reform Party gained seats in the 1884 
election.
50




The 1886 election served as evidence of the increased conflict displayed with 
each election after 1874. Although David Kalākaua remained unpopular among the 
island’s elite and much of the growing middle class, his break from the American-
Hawaiian businessmen brought support among the pro-sovereignty movement’s 
members. Throughout the process, bribery allegations were leveled against the two major 
parties.
52
 At its conclusion on February 3, Gibson and the native movement held eighteen 
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of the twenty-eight seats, while their adversary, the American businessmen’s 
representatives occupied the remaining nine.
53
   
The session marked a chaotic legislature as the haole minority challenged 
measures they regarded as inconsistent with the public welfare.
54
 As political opposition 
against the king intensified, Kalākaua’s allies Spreckels and Gibson, became liabilities. 
The main source of discontent involved the premier’s call for a two million dollar loan 
amidst the budget deficit.
55
 His request met with unilateral displeasure from the political 
and commercial representatives, including Claus Spreckels who questioned the 
expenditures after his previous financial rescue.
56
 With broad support in the legislature, a 




After years of being labeled Spreckels’ puppet, David Kalākaua broke from his 
benefactor and sought financial assistance from London to free himself from the 
American’s influence.
58
 With his ally’s absence and his cabinet’s termination, Walter 
Gibson lost the support he previously mustered under the Reform Party’s constant 
pressure.
59
 The loan passed through the assembly on October 13, 1886, and marked 
Spreckels’ loss of influence over the islands.
60 
In victory over the king’s allies, the 
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opposition faced a new concern, Hawaii’s potential debt to the British government gave 
the maritime power advantage over Kalākaua. Based on the misspending, the possibility 
of defaulting risked England using the public revenues as collateral security.
 61
 In the 
United States, the situation brought concern to Grover Cleveland’s administration. The 
US minister, George Merrill, asserted Kalākaua was working to replace the government 
with Hawaiians and diminish their influence.
62
 Using the exclusive privileges granted 
under the reciprocity treaty, the US successfully blocked the loan.
63
  
Lacking voting power in the parliament, there seemed no hope for the American-
Hawaiian subjects to enact reforms through legislative methods.
64
 In late 1886, haole 
displeasure led to the established of the Hawaiian League. Thirteen of its members 
formed an executive committee, which governed the political group operation and 
policies.
65
 Originally formed to effect change in the ministry and reforms in the old 
constitution, as membership increased, the League assumed a revolutionary tone.
66
 
Within the party, two ideologies fought for control. One group advocated the monarchy’s 
overthrow, the establishment of a republic, and the annexation to the United States, while 
the less radical wing sought to retain independence, but felt that the king’s power 
required limitation through a new constitution.
67
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To avoid interference or discovery, the meetings took place at night and rarely 
twice in succession at the same location.
68
 Upon their discovery in June 1887, the 
organization used the press, public platforms, and petitions to garner support.
69
 The 
tensions multiplied when the Anglo militia, the Honolulu Rifles, joined the League (See 
Picture 12).
70 
As their rhetoric amplified tensions, the Hawaiian League suppressed the 
more radical members in favor of preserving the monarchy.
71
 By June 26, 1887, the 




As the US Minister to the Kingdom of Hawaii, George Merrill counseled both the 
monarchy and the American-Hawaiian radicals. He advised the League that moderation 
and the adoption of peaceful measures remained the best method to gain popular public 
support. Additionally, he warned the men not to encourage or participate in any act 
whereby trade or commerce risked interruption. The minister also reminded them that he 
lacked the authorization to determine the United States’ response to their plans.
73
 Plagued 
with rumors of a pending military revolt and a lack of confidence in his council, on the 
night of June 27, 1887, Kalākaua sent for Merrill. Upon reviewing the situation, the 
minister acknowledged the people’s dissatisfaction and proposed he heed the voices 
related to those who maintained the country’s wealth. He further indicated that Gibson’s 
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removal would pacify their anger and avoid a conflict. Upon his departure, it was 




On June 30, 1887, a public meeting took place in the Honolulu Rifle’s armory. 
Lorrin Thurston accused the monarchy of corruption and incompetence regarding the 
protection of personal and property rights.
75
 He identified the League’s membership as 
Hawaiians who acted in sympathy with, and on behalf of all, the kingdom’s “right 
minded citizens, residents, and taxpayers.”
76
 The meeting’s leaders submitted a resolution 
that called for Walter Gibson’s dismissal, and called for the king to no longer inhibit or 
unduly influence the legislature.
77
 They also discouraged Kalākaua from interfering with 
the administration of his cabinet and the use his official position or patronage for private 
ends.
78
 Upon the declaration’s unanimous support, the Committee of Thirteen presented 
the document to Kalākaua and allotted him twenty-four hours to answer their demands. 
The monarch responded the declaration was unnecessary as their demands were already 
instituted on June 28.
79
 He indicated his willingness to submit the whole subject to the 
new cabinet and to act accordingly on their advice.
80
 David Kalākaua acceded to each of 
the specific ultimatums and assured the committee of his readiness to cooperate with “our 
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counselors and advisors as well as our intelligent and patriotic citizens in all matters 
touching the honor, welfare, and prosperity of our kingdom.”
81
  
In the presence of illegally armed men patrolling the streets, David Kalākaua sent 
for the American, British, French, Portuguese, and Japanese diplomatic representatives, 
and expressed his desire to temporary annex the kingdom to their nations on July 1. As 
the diplomats encouraged his continued leadership, the foreign representatives declared 
their unwillingness to accept his request. Since the king previously agreed to the 
revolutionaries’ demands, the ministers advised him to form the new ministry.
82
 
Throughout the meeting, Merrill remained indifferent, if not hostile to the Reform Party, 
but at the last moment changed to a position of neutrality.
83
  
On July 6, 1887, less than a week after the American-Hawaiians exerted force 
upon the king to yield his policies and cabinet, the new constitution received Kalākaua’s 
official acceptance.
84
 Written by Lorrin Thurston, it implemented sweeping changes to 
the kingdom’s administration. Although the charter provided for the monarchy’s 
continuance, the power dynamic shifted in the Privy Council’s favor. It stated monarchal 
directives lacked legitimacy unless endorsed by a cabinet member.
 
The law specified the 
royal council served at the legislature’s pleasure rather than the kingship.
85
 
 In response to the revolution, Secretary of State Bayard stated he regretted the 
“existence of domestic disorders in Hawaii,” but the United States retained no legal 
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grounds to interfere in the nation’s domestic affairs.
86
 He reminded the American 
minister, “no intent is cherished or policy entertained by the United States which is 
otherwise than friendly to the autonomical control and independence of Hawaii.”
87
 
Although the US respected the inhabitants and their government’s right, the secretary 
acknowledged the islands’ importance to American interests. He cautioned that if the 
situation showed any indication of interfering with United States or its citizens’ welfare 
the US maintained a duty to protect.
88
 In August 1889, under Merrill and Wodehouse’s 
advice, King David Kalākaua accepted his Supreme Court’s decision that in effect he 
held no constitutional right to exercise his discretion or withhold his approval of policies 
embraced by his ministers.
89
  
Lorrin Thurston and William DeWitt Alexander’s post-script writings asserted the 
constitution was not in accordance with the Hawaii’s laws created by their forefathers, 
but in their opinion neither was the United States’ Declaration of Independence from 
Britain. The men declared that both represented revolutionary documents, which required 
force to implement and ensure longevity.
90
 For the native people, the 1887 revolt created 
the “Bayonet Constitution.”
91
 Ironically, King David Kalākaua, not the American-
Hawaiian subjects experienced the people’s anger regarding the shift in power. The 
legislators provided little, if any, resistance to impede the League constitutional 
modification, which created the impression that they supported the businessmen. Despite 
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the lack of protest, the divide between the kanaka and the haoles increased with the 
intensification of racial hatred.
92
  
David Kalākaua’s reign undermines the romanticized narrative regarding 
Hawaii’s last king. His weaknesses incensed Native and American-Hawaiians alike and 
served to increase the tension between the political and economic leaders. At a time when 
the kanaka needed a strong leader like Alexander ʻIolani Liholiho or Lot Kapuāiwa, they 
instead suffered under an opportunist lost in the privileges of his title. Nevertheless, the 
Western subjects’ deep entrenchment within the society begs the question, what options 
remained available to reduce the Missionary Boys influence?
93
 The 1887 revolution 
demonstrated the haoles’ hypocrisy and their disregard towards the political system their 
ancestors instituted. Conversely, it also displayed the Hawaiian leadership’s enduring 
corruption and inexperience. The long delay in action against the businessmen 
encourages the question; did the legislature support the coup? After 1887, the Native 
Hawaiians and their future monarch sought to regain their lost influence through the 
limitation of the white communities’ power. For the Committee of Thirteen, their 
overriding priority involved maintaining their newly obtained positions of authority in the 
face of their weakening stature. The fight for Hawaii’s destiny was now underway, but 
unfortunately, the future promised more turbulence that forced a final show down 
between the two groups. 
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The Hawaiian Monarchy’s Collapse 
 
The haole businessmen’s forceful attainment of increased influence within the 
monarchy provided only limited advantages that over the succeeding five years dissipated 
from their own shortcomings and the lack of their closest allies’ support. New obstacles 
arose during their decline that paled in comparison to the problems that inspired the 1887 
uprising. The arrival of an American diplomat on a personal mission to undermine the 
Hawaiian government added to the tension that continued to debilitate the already 
tumultuous relationship between the political and economic leaders. Inspired by the 
official’s support and motivated by their ethnocentric and capitalistic ideologies, the 
Anglo-American community placed the blame for the islands’ problems upon monarchy 
for which the 1887 constitution relieved all practical power. By 1892’s conclusion, the 
economic situation in the islands, Queen Lydia Lili’uokalani’s attempt to regain power 
through the legislature, and the growth of foreign influence in the kingdom, stirred the 
American-Hawaiian businessmen to once again violate their own constitution through 
another revolution. To achieve lasting political power and increased commercial profits, 
they abandoned all restraint and committed to the Hawaiian sovereignty’s complete 
collapse in favor of eliciting permanent American control.  
Despite the sweeping reforms that placed additional power with the Western 
subjects, the Bayonet Constitution failed to ensure their complete control of the 
government for the Hawaiian legislature maintained the authority to remove the ministers 
from office and undo the new charter. However, no such attempt took place in the years 





greater of two evils. The Wilcox Revolution of July 29, 1889, provided evidence for the 
people’s discontent in their king. Lead by Robert Wilcox, an armed force attempted to 
acquire possession of the Iolani Palace and force the king’s abdication in favor of his 
sister, Princess Lydia Lili’uokalani (See Picture 13).
1
 Although the Wilcox Revolution 
failed, it rejuvenated the pro-Hawaiian political movement and initiated a gradual repeal 
of the American-Hawaiian subject’s power.
2
 
The 1890 parliamentary elections provided the Palace Party a partial victory and 
secured their renewed control over the political committees. Within three years of their 
revolution, the pro-American politicians once again constituted the minority within the 
government. Because the legislature did not attempt to reverse the 1887 modifications to 
the constitution or remove the League members from the privy consul Kalakaua’s success 
did little to strengthen his position.
3
 As the islands entered the new decade, it appeared 
that the monarchy was no longer a political factor in Hawaiian politics. The shifting 
power, however, alarmed men like Lorrin Thurston that the royal party retained the 
possibility to force their ministry’s resignation. 
The League’s weakness emanated not from the Hawaiian people or their 
representatives, but rather from their own members. Constant internal conflicts regarding 
the party’s mission undermined its cohesiveness at a time when the native populace’s 
apathy towards the white community gradually gave way to resentment. In October 1890, 
the party experienced a second loss that promised to undermine their achievements over 
the previous four decades. The United States implementation of the McKinley Tariff Act 
                                                 
1
 Dole, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, 60, 65; Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian 
Revolution, 181-2. 
2
 The Reform Party represented the haole Businessmen who sought to reduce the power of the 
monarchy or terminate it all together.  
3





ended the 1875 American-Hawaiian treaty of Reciprocity by raising the average duty on 
imports nearly 50 percent.
4
 The differential advantage Hawaiian sugar enjoyed in the US 
market diminished with disastrous consequences as the price of raw sugar dropped from 
$100 to sixty dollars per ton, resulting in the reduction of production, a drop in wages, 
and an increase in unemployment.
5
 With the economic scheme of the Pacific nation in 
chaos, any change that promised a chance to preserve the haole businessmen’s standing 
remained preferable to their foreseeable devastation.
6
 
In 1891, the Palace Party’s momentum suffered a temporary setback with King 
David Kalakaua’s death during a visit to San Francisco on February 22.
7
 Nine days later 
the monarchy passed to his sister, Lydia Lili’uokalani.
8
 The fifty-three year old queen 
appeared well fitted to administer the government as she maintained a reputation as a 
dignified leader and her devout Christian beliefs ensured her support among many 
Westerners.
9
 Her strong avocation for Hawaiian nationality, however, created panic 
among the foreign businessmen as the Pacific nation slipped deeper into an economic 
depression.
10
 US President Benjamin Harrison’s newly appointed Minister to the Islands 
John L. Stevens maintained these concerns regarding the new monarch. In his numerous 
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communications with Secretary of State James G. Blaine and John W. Foster, the 
minister stated his displeasure with the new monarch and advocated increased American 
intervention (See Picture 15).
11
 
The president’s administration characterized the political pendulum’s swing from 
the former Democratic President Grover Cleveland’s restrained diplomatic policies to the 
aggressive expansionist views embraced by Harrison’s Republican Party. The members 
considered Hawaii an indirect territory in both title and influence. They reasoned the 
majority of the realm was American owned, educated, and governed. Furthermore, men 
like Stevens noted the kingdom also relied mainly upon US trade and thus its existence 
depended upon his country. Under such conditions the expansionist politicians surmised, 
Hawaii’s appropriation seemed inevitable.
12
 The problem remained that the United States 
was not the only country with interests in Hawaii. Any aggressive actions towards 
domination violated international laws and risked an international incident with European 
nations capable of devastating economic or military retaliation.
13
 
The official mandate for the US minister to Hawaii dictated the promotion of 
positive relations between the two counties without the degradation of the monarchy’s 
absolute independence. In the event the native leadership drifted from their influence or 
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another country attempted to take possession of the archipelago, their orders urged the 
use of aggressive diplomatic, not military, action to ensure American political 
dominance.
14
 Contrary to these instructions, John Stevens displayed open contempt 
towards Queen Lili’uokalani.
15
 In April 1892, he interfered with the conviction of two 
Americans who plotted the Hawaiian government’s overthrow. Five months later, the 
minister displayed “uncouth” and “ungentlemanly” behavior when he demanded the 
queen mandate all criticism regarding his policies and actions in the islands’ private 
newspapers become illegal, as it constituted insults against the United States.
16
 The 
insolent actions gained criticism at home and abroad. As a diplomat, his violation of 
accepted etiquette warranted potential recall, but “the queen good-naturedly over looked 
the insult and forgave his ignorance and ill-temper.”
17
 Despite her forgiveness and the 
displeasure of the ali’i and kanaka, Stevens continued to engage in public speeches 
condemning the kingdom and its place in a modern society.
18
 
The minister’s open contempt for the queen, coupled with the mounting economic 
depression and the general unease within the kingdom, encouraged the return of 
revolutionary thoughts among the Anglo-American subjects. In spring 1892, the new 
generation of conservative haole businessmen and politicians in Honolulu organized 
small secretive group known as the Annexation Club (See Picture 14).
19
 The 
organization’s objective involved ensuring a quick judicious response in the event 
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prominent native islanders precipitated action that threatened to further degrade the white 
community’s influence in the kingdom.
20
 Unlike the disorganized Hawaiian League, its 
small membership of thirteen predominant businessmen guaranteed a cohesive 
administration. Its members consisted of pro-business white lawyers, merchants, planters, 
bankers, directors and part owners of large corporations with millions of dollars in their 
own names or as trustees.
21
 
On March 29, 1892, Annexation Club representative Lorrin Andrews Thurston 
sailed to Washington to meet with government leaders.
22
 With a letter of introduction 
from John Stevens, he met with James Blaine to advise the secretary of state regarding 
the organization’s mission. Thurston assured the secretary the members sustained no 
intention of precipitating action in Honolulu, but warned the preservation of peace 
remained impossible because of Lydia Lili’uokalani’s desire to promulgate a revised 
constitution. He indicated in such an event his supporters intended to seek annexation to 
the United States provided the proposal sustained the State Department’s endorsement.
23
 
When Blaine referred the envoy to Benjamin Harrison, the president refused to see him, 
but through the Secretary of the Navy passed on the administration’s sympathy.
24
 
As the 1892 Hawaiian election neared, no one political group commanded a 
majority in the legislative body.
25
 In a time of financial regression and racial tension, an 
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epidemic of distrust rendered the government ineffective as neither side maintained the 
willingness to reach a compromise. The principal issue during the campaign among the 
plantation owners, businessmen, and the Western subjects, involved the reestablishment 
of free trade with the US.
26
 Their opposition maintained three objectives, which included 
a new constitution, the incumbent cabinet’s replacement, and a challenge to the United 
States’ exclusive and permanent control of Pearl Harbor as they feared it endangered the 
kingdom’s sovereignty.
27
 Many kanaka and ali’i criticized the monarch for yielding to 
the haoles’ influence and ignoring the indigenous people’s needs.
28
 In reaction the queen 
stated, “to have ignored or disregarded so general a request, I must have been deaf to the 
voice of the people, which tradition tells us is the voice of God.
29
 No true Hawaiian chief 
would have done other than to promise a consideration of their wishes.”
30
 
At the session’s opening on May 28, 1892, Lili’uokalani declared her 
commitment to the 1887 constitution and asserted her dedication the subjects’ rights and 
privileges. In recognition to the Native Hawaiians, the queen pledged to also preserve the 
kingdom’s autonomy.
31
 The legislative dysfunction provided an ominous sign of the 
Pacific nation’s desperate future.
32
 More so then the session’s two major issues, a fight to 
control the cabinet and proposals to modify the constitution, the failed 1886 lottery and 
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opium licensing bills gained the greatest press within the islands.
33
 On November 4, 
1892, after nearly eight months of debate, the Reform Party retained their control over 
Lili’uokalani’s Privy Council with her final acceptance of four pro-American subjects. 
The appointment of the cabinet represented not only a victory over the queen, but proof 
of US ascendancy over British and other anti-American sentiments.
34
 
With the ministry under the haole businessmen’s control, annexation rumors ran 
through the kingdom. A general understanding existed concerning Minister Stevens’ 
willingness to support the monarchy’s removal and the support he engendered from the 
naval ship USS Boston’s captain, Gilbert Conwall Wiltse. The United States man-of-War 
arrived in the islands on with orders to ensure an official American presence in the 
islands throughout the perceived unrest (See picture 16).
35
 What many failed to know, 
concerned US Secretary of State John W. Foster’s directive to Stevens. It stated that since 
the situation remained so chaotic, an attempt to facilitate change in the islands held little 
chance of success considering the minimal amount of time left in the Harrison 
Administration. Foster felt the annexation question was too complicated to find quick 
passage in the American Congress, especially when President-elect Glover Cleveland’s 
anti-expansionist policies condoned such an enterprise.
36
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On November 21, 1892, T. T. Williams, a nationally known editor of San 
Francisco’s Examiner, published his story investigating the kingdom’s social and 
political upheaval. His survey of the forty-two Hawaiian House of Common’s members 
revealed only ten desired annexation, while thirty-two favored autonomy.
37
 The 
representatives serving in the House of Nobles’ responded to the same question based 
upon their property interests. Some suggested only the United States retained the ability 
to return the sugar trust, while others remained convinced a large majority of the 
Hawaiian people opposed appropriation and asserted Great Britain never received serious 
consideration as a new protectorate.
38
 In his final analysis, Williams concluded the 
kingdom’s majority populations opposed a union with the United States and that much of 
the partisan crisis in Honolulu resulted from Stevens’ meddling.
39
 
In the United States, the Hawaiian question brought mixed responses from 
congress and the public. Individuals who supported annexation followed the general 
attitudes of the Harrison administration and the American-Hawaiians, while those who 
opposed maintained multiple motivations.
40
 The agricultural interests remained the 
greatest opponent, as the islands’ appropriation promised to undo everything they fought 
to gain through the McKinley Tariff Act. The commercial concerns were followed by the 
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 Sess., 183-4. 
40





numerous Americans who questioned if colonial aspirations violated the US 
Constitution’s foundation of anti-imperialism. Finally, many within the conservative 
parties assumed the absorption of people of non-Caucasian heritage threatened the 
country’s already tarnished racial purity.
41
 With strong opposition against annexation in 
both countries, the Hawaiian League’s long-range goals seemed nothing more than a 
fantasy.  
In January 1893, however, a new eruption from the long restrained simmering 
tension seemed inevitable. The government’s disarray and worsening racial relations 
continued to fuel discontent as the McKinley Tariff Act persisted to wreak havoc upon 
the kingdom’s economy. The divide between its haole and native representatives 
prevented the possibility of compromise for the kingdom’s benefit.
42
 As the Reform Party 
controlled ministry continued to suppress the queen’s policies, throughout December 
1892 and January 1893, the Hawaiian dominated legislature’s attempts to remove the 
Privy Council failed to gain the required votes.
43
 
The controversial lottery and opium bills served as the trigger, which eventually 
returned the power to the queen and signaled to the foreigners that their influence in the 
islands neared its conclusion.
44
 Although their objections to the two bills maintained a 
moral slant, the businessmen’s actual fear related to the potential threat to their economic 
and political position. They recognized the legislations’ ability to produce enough 
revenue to render the monarch independent of their influence. Additionally, the income 
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maintained the potential to reduce the islands’ financial distress perpetrated by the 
McKinley Tariff and thus diminish annexation’s advantages.
45
 On January 11, 1893, the 
lottery bill passed 23 to 20 thus signifying a major defeat for the Reform Party. As a 
minister in the queen’s cabinet, Lorrin Thurston unleashed repeated condemnations of the 
numerous Hawaiian and Anglo-American representatives who supported the bill. With 
each angry rant, the he damaged his platform’s floundering support. By the day’s end, 




The success of the native-dominated Liberal Party in establishing the lottery and 
opium bills emboldened Queen Lili’uokalani. For the first time she openly discussed 
implementing modifications to the 1887 constitution. In response, the white community 
again resorted to revolution to restore their waning influence.
47
 They alleged the islands’ 
prosperity required the permanent establishment of favorable leadership and demanded 
United States intervention to secure the “stability of government” to facilitate an 
immediate “influx of capital and institute a period of prosperity.”
48
 Over the next three 
days, the two groups worked to form their respective strategies. 
On Saturday, January 14, 1893, word permeated throughout Honolulu concerning 
Lili’uokalani’s planned promulgation of a revised constitution.
49
 Composed of clippings 
from the 1864 and 1887 statutes, the document mirrored the instrument under which 
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David Kalakaua ruled prior to the 1887 political coup.
50
 The week before the legislature’s 
closing, each of the American-Hawaiian cabinet nominees gave the sovereign assurances 
of their support.
51
 At ten o’clock the next morning, the queen informed the ministers of 
her intention to officially propagate the new accord.
52
 After the announcement, the 
ministry rescinded their support under the assumption it might trigger another uprising. 
Lili’uokalani recollected, “They had let me out to the edge of the precipice, and now they 
were leaving me to take the step alone. It was humiliating.”
53
 When she indicated her 
willingness to assume the blame, her advisors requested an additional evening to re-
examine the statutes and make necessary changes. After a long argument, the queen 




As the monarch debated with her Privy Council, the annexationists drafted a 
declaration that stated her “subversion” represented an attempted coup against the Pacific 
nation’s principles.
55
 On the afternoon of January 14, 1893, the American-Hawaiian 
businessmen formed a new committee inspired by the French Revolution’s Committee of 
Public Safety. Mirroring advice provided by President Grant decades earlier, the 
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organization sought to remove the queen from power and form a provisional government 
with the explicit objective to formally request annexation to the United States.
56
 The 
committee’s leadership comprised many of the 1887 revolution’s former Hawaiian 
League and the Honolulu Rifles participants.
57
 Once committed to action, the 
organization informed Minister Stevens of the situation and inquired as to his intended 
response to their proposed uprising. Failing to gain his immediate support, the 
Annexation Club met again to ascertain their access to military force.
58
 Although the 
Honolulu Rifles exceeded one hundred well-armed men, Lorrin Thurston suspected 
without the assistance of troops from the USS Boston, their cause remained in jeopardy.
59
 
When Marshal Charles Burnett Wilson, the head of the island’s law enforcement, 
requested permission from the queen and her cabinet to arrest the agitators they 
unanimously opted to avoid a direct confrontation. Mirroring The Committee for Public 
Safety, the Hawaiian officials queried John Stevens about his planned course of action in 
the event of an armed coup. The minister responded that he backed the American-
Hawaiian businessmen, but failed to provide the specific details regarding his strategy.
60
 
Recognizing the situation’s complexity, the Lili’uokalani sought to gain the advice of 
conservative businessmen friendly to the monarch and the diplomatic representatives of 
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the various countries represented in Hawaii.
61
 In response, they advised that the best 
course of action dictated the reform’s abandonment until a later date and a public 
proclamation assuring the community of the delay.
62
 
At 10:00 A.M. the following day, The Committee for Public Safety authorized its 
members to take whatever measures considered necessary to protect their public 
interest.
63
 After the meeting, Thurston called on John Stevens to inform him of the 
revised strategy. The minister cautioned the committee that legally, he lacked the 
authority to recognize the revolutionary administration until it became fully established, 
and the United States forces could not take sides.
64
 According to Hawaiian law and 
precedent, a military landing required the request of the government in authority. In 
acknowledgment of Stevens’ situation, and his implied support, Thurston withdrew their 
official request regarding the USS Boston. Despite the extraction, Captain Wiltse 
concluded troops were required and prepared for their deployment. For the first time in 
the kingdom’s history, American forces prepared to land in the islands despite the 
existing government’s vehement opposition.
65
 
At 9:00 A.M. on Monday, January 16, 1893, the committee met to organize a 
mass meeting for that afternoon. Lacking the authorization to arrest its members, Marshal 
Wilson attempted personally to persuade the businessmen to end the revolt. Wilson 
informed the group that they exceeded the legal scope of action since the matter of the 
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constitution no longer existed. The marshal argued the foreign representatives accepted 
the queen’s declaration, and thus, so should they.
66
 Thurston responded, “I’m sorry for 
the country, but what guarantee have we that this will not happen again? It is living on a 
volcano; there’s no telling when it will explode.”
67
 
As word disseminated regarding the American-Hawaiian subject’s contemplated 
revolution, the kanaka began to take up arms to protect Liliuokalani’s monarchy and their 
sovereignty. Despite Marshal Wilson’s continued call to meet force with force, 
Lili’uokalani and her cabinet issued a proclamation asking for peaceful protests. She 
assured the public that changes to the constitution remained her desire, but the hostility 
that permeated the island required its postponement. The Hawaiian leadership solicited 
the people to accept the monarch’s assurances and ensure the safety of the populace.
68
 
At 2:00 P.M. that day, the two parties held meetings in Honolulu. The first 
occurred at the former Honolulu Rifles Armory, which attracted an estimated crowd of 
1,000 people. Nearly all white, the attendees represented the majority of the annexationist 
movement. Lorrin Thurston read a series of preambles and six resolutions drawn up by 
the Committee of Thirteen. They condemned the monarch and called upon the 
membership to use any means possible to “secure the permanent maintenance of law and 
order and the protection of life, liberty, and property in Hawaii.”
69
 The rhetoric declared 
the kingdom resembled a slumbering volcano, which maintained the potential “to spew 
out blood and destroy us all.”
70
 In the course of the meeting, a messenger arrived with a 
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statement from Queen Lili’uokalani that promised to postpone the constitutional revisions 
and assured the men that the modification would only occur through the legal processes 
designated in the 1887 statutes. The declaration received no consideration from the 
committee members who questioned the value of her assurances and asserted it was “not 
her fault that the streets have not run red with blood.”
71
 
The second meeting that assembled on Palace Square represented the Palace 
Party’s supporters. Nearly 2,000 people came to the meeting, which displayed a greater 
diversity of nationalities and a less belligerent tone. Lili’uokalani supporters 
complemented the crowd on their good behavior over the previous days and renewed the 
call for law and order. Regarding the abandoned constitutional changes, the speakers 
asked the people for their patience and promised the debate’s return at some point in the 
future.
72
 The queen’s commitment to Hawaiian sovereignty remained intact, despite the 
momentary surrender to ensure the public’s safety. Both meetings acted as a “safety 
valve” which allowed the populace to vent their frustrations and greatly contributed to the 
“calm after the storm.”
73




At the closure of their meeting, the Committee of Public Safety wrote to Stevens 
to request his assistance as they lacked the ability to “protect ourselves without aid and, 
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therefore, pray for the protection of the United States forces” in an environment of 
“general alarm and terror.”
75
 In response to Thurston and the committee, Stevens wrote:  
The conditions are so serious, and the possibilities of trouble so great, that 
it is my duty to protect the lives and property of American subjects with 
every available means within my power; and I am going to land American 
troops immediately for that purpose. I’ve already given orders to that 





At 4:30 P.M., Gilbert Wiltse received orders from John Stevens to deploy his 
forces into the city of Honolulu.
77
 The 164 men consisted of three companies of naval 
blue jackets, an artillery group, and a marine contingent. A small squad deployed to 
protect the American legation and consulate, while the others positioned themselves 
around the city in full view of Queen Lili’uokalani (See Picture 17).
78
 In later testimony, 
Hawaiian Minister of Finance William H. Cornwell observed, “If the troops were landed 
solely for the protection of American property, the placing of them so far away from the 
center of property of Americans and so very close to the property of the Hawaiian 
government was remarkable and very suggestive.”
79
 His concern received support from 
United States Steamer Portsmouth Commander, J. S. Skerritt, who stated, the troops were 
                                                 
75
 Citizen’s Committee of Safety to John L. Stevens, January 16, 1893, Morgan Report II, 1309. 
76
 Despite the letter he sent to Stevens, Thurston stated that they did not want the USS Boston’s 
troops in Honolulu and Stevens acted on his own. Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, 68-9. 
77
 Lt. Young, of the USS Boston, gave another version of the decision in order to land forces. He 
stated on Sunday Capt. Wiltse came to the conclusion that troops should be landed, and he acted on his own 
authority. At about 10:30 am on Monday he was convinced that the Queen’s government could not protect 
life and property and decided that he would order his men ashore. Mr. Stevens to Mr. Wiltse, January 16, 
1893,US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Compilation of Reports of Committee 1789-1901: 





(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1901), 893 (Serial Set #4052) Hereafter Hawaiian Islands. 
78
 Chief Justice Alfred F Judd stated that the location chosen maintained no significant indication 
of any intention on the part of the United States troops to defend any uprising against the Queen’s 
government. Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 178-9; “Of What Are They Afraid?” The 
Daily Bulletin, January 17, 1893, 3. 
79





positioned to ensure the free movement of the provisional government, rather than the 
protection of American subjects and their property.
80
 
During the US forces’ landing, the queen’s cabinet informed Stevens the 
monarchy maintained the personnel to protect the public and to suppress the rebellion, 
but the minister replied that since the troops remained committed, their recall was not 
required. When asked if he intended to support the Committee of Public Safety, he 
answered that he maintained no such intention and the military served only to preserve 
Lili’uokalani’s authority. When the cabinet again emphasized displeasure with the armed 
servicemen’s deployment, Stevens instructed them to, “Make a protest in writing and if 
you make it in a friendly spirit I will answer it in the same tone.”
81
 Upon receiving the 
formal written protest, Stevens acknowledged the following day whatever the United 




The O’ahu Governor, Archibald Scott Cleghorn, also protested the landing of 
armed forces without the monarchy’s permission violated international law. In the past, 
he reminded the minister, the deployment of American troops for drill purposes failed to 
require official authorization, but on this occasion, the circumstances remained different. 
“Ostensibly the present landing is for the discharge of functions which are distinctly 
responsible duties of the Hawaiian government.”
83
 Stevens responded, the US diplomatic 
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and navy representatives assumed a regard for the islanders’ welfare.
84
 As the night of 
January 16, 1893, ended, Lili’uokalani maintained her authority, but took no action based 
upon her fears of challenging the naval personnel.
85
 
Around 2:30 P.M. the next day, the Committee of Thirteen read their formal 
proclamation in the presence of the council’s members, their clerks, and one ali’i 
legislative member. The announcement asserted they represented all Hawaiians and acted 
for their common good. It declared that a representative and responsible administration 
able to protect itself from revolutionary uprisings and aggression was no longer possible 
under the queen and her cabinet.
86
 The document stated change remained necessary to 
avoid further damage to the island’s credit and to avoid ruining the overstrained financial 
system. They demanded the monarchy’s resignation and the installment of a provisional 
government “to exist until terms of union with the United States of America have been 
negotiated and agreed upon.”
87
 Immediately after the proclamation’s presentation, forty 
to sixty volunteers from the Honolulu Rifles took key positions throughout the city, 
without hindrance from the American troops. The militia cleared the grounds of 
spectators and positioned themselves at the gates. Within an hour, an additional 100 to 
200 riflemen assumed stations in front of the federal building and, upon the securing of 
the facility, the provisional government established their official headquarters.
88
 
A short time after the proclamation, American Lieutenant Lucien Young 
delivered a message from Captain Wiltse extending his complements to the Committee of 
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Public Safety and inquiring if they maintained absolute control of the police and National 
Guard.
89
 The provisional government’s president, Stanford Dole, responded they failed to 
have control of the military and police facilities, but maintained a sufficient force to 
sustain their command of the federal building. Young responded that if they failed to 
secure the monarchy, the US lacked the legal authorization to provide any assistance to 
their provisional government.
90
 When Dole requested the US troops, both Stevens and 
Captain Wilkse informed him the provisional government lacked official recognition 
until it gained possession of the police station and the army barracks.
91
 
Fifteen minutes after the reading of the proclamation James S. Walker, the 
president of the legislative assembly, apprised the queen that the opposition party 
requested she abdicate. Lili’uokalani responded that held no intention to relinquish her 
throne. John Stevens informed the Hawaiian representatives of his official 
acknowledgement of the new leadership and advised her surrender.
92
 With the 
understanding that the US minister recognized the provisional administration, the 
monarch, and her cabinet under protest relinquished their authority pending a resolution 
from Washington. Their decision resembled the “life of the land” policy of Kamehameha 
III, who upon the kingdom’s invasion of British troops, yielded until England reversed 
the actions of its rogue commander. The queen also planned to acquiesce to the United 
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States’ superior military under the control of John L. Stevens until the US president 
reversed the scheme.
93
 The royal protest concluded: 
Now, to avoid any collision of armed forces and perhaps the loss of life, I 
do, under protest, and impelled by said forces, yield my authority until 
such a time as the government of the United States shall, upon facts being 
presented to it, undo the action of its representatives and reinstate me in 




At 7:00 P.M., approximately three hours after Minister Stevens acknowledged the 
provisional government, President Stanford Dole received the queen’s protest and under 
her directive, Marshall Wilson relinquished the police station, the barracks, and all 
federal property under his control (See Picture 18). On January 17, 1893, the Hawaiian 
Islands shifted from majority Hawaiian control, to the haole minority and the end to the 
people’s sovereignty.   
The United States’ abandonment of the 1874 Treaty of Commercial Reciprocity, 
the Missionary Boy’s loss of power within the government, and the queen’s attempt to 
modify the constitution signified defining moments that lead to the final confrontation. In 
the end, the privileged Hawaiian classes’ inexperience gave way to the xenophobia, 
arrogance, and greed of the Anglo-American subjects. As Hawaiian borne subjects who 
maintained commercial and legal ties to the kingdom, their actions represented the 
domestic conflict independent of American foreign policy. However, the actions of US 
Minister to Hawaii John L. Stevens, whether he acted independently or not, blurred the 
line between an internal struggle and American imperialism. His role as an American 
diplomat and his involvement of American marines implicated the United States 
government in the coup d'état. The critical events, which followed the revolution and 
                                                 
93
 Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 189-90. 
94





determined the future of the fallen kingdom, occurred not in the islands or through the 
discourse of its people, but rather within the public and political realm of the United 
States. For the next five years, the Hawaiian Islands’ right to self-determination became 
lost in the center of an American debate as to whether or not its physical influence should 
expand beyond the borders of the continent. Throughout the process, the actions of the 
American congress and three presidents further blurred the line between American 
imperialism and a series of unfortunate events that maintained no malice or intent 






The Appropriation of the Hawaiian Republic 
   
The placement of the Pacific kingdom’s future in the United States government’s 
control was the American-Hawaiian revolutionaries’ intentional final stage to formally 
end the islands’ monarchy and sidestep the tariffs that crippled their markets. After the 
revolution the Hawaiian Question transformed into an American discourse over the 
national narrative regarding its foreign policy and moral representation before the world. 
Throughout the debate, Lili’uokalani and her native subjects experienced a roller coaster 
ride resulting from the United States government’s shifting opinions over several 
presidential administrations. In the end, an unforeseen international conflict provided the 
American expansionists and the Hawaiian annexationists with a critical advantage that 
forever changed the role of the US on the global stage. Without the Spanish American 
War and the Republican Party’s majority in the US House, Hawaii’s appropriation may 
never have occurred.   
 With Hawaii under the provisional government’s control, the second phase of the 
unofficial Grant Doctrine went into effect on January 19, 1893.
1
 A commission 
representing the American-Hawaiian businessmen procured the inter-island steamer 
Claudine to sail to the United States. Their mission sought to petition the administration 
of President Benjamin Harrison to annex the former kingdom (See Picture 19).
2
 Lacking 
access to a private ship, Queen Lili’uokalani’s delegation departed for Washington on 
                                                 
1
 Dole, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, 90; Thurston, Memoirs of the Hawaiian 
Revolution, 283.  
2
 The ship was owned by a sugar magnate who supported the Annexation membership. “Latest 
Intelligence: The Revolution in Hawaii,” The Times London, January 31, 1893, 5; “The Claudine Departs,” 





February 1, 1893, on the commercial ship SS Australia.
3
 The thirteen-day lead allowed 
the provisional government’s envoys the time to carefully shape and disseminates their 
narrative to the American public without challenge. In their meetings with numerous 
reporters, they asserted the queen engaged in a political coup to subvert the 1887 
constitution. As “responsible citizens,” the white community maintained no other option 
but to terminate the troublesome monarchy.
4
 The commission stated the role of the US 
Minister to Hawaii, John Stevens, and the USS Boston’s troops remained limited to the 
protection of American citizens and their property. Stevens, they insisted, acted only in 
the capacity as a diplomat, not as a fellow revolutionary intent upon the monarchy’s 
collapse.
5
    
When Washington received word regarding the coup on January 28, 1893, the 
Harrison administration hurried to ascertain its response to the developing events. After 
meetings between Secretary of State John W. Foster and the Hawaiian representative to 
the United States, Mott Smith, the president chose to support the annexationists through 
two possible actions.
6
 His options included assuming the role as a protectorate or the 
islands’ appropriation as a territory or state. The president favored the latter course for it 
represented the best action to secure his country’s interests in the region. Harrison and 
Foster anticipated favorable press reaction to the revolution and prompt congressional 
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approval appeared a reasonable possibility.
7
 The major obstacle, as they earlier feared, 
remained the limited time left in their term to overcome the anti-annexationist and anti-
expansionists in the Congress.
8
 
On Capitol Hill, the sentiment split generally along partisan lines and resurrected 
the debates of the previous four decades. The Republican Party considered the union a 
natural result of a century of close political and commercial relations between the two 
countries.
9
 They identified the islands’ importance to the United States in securing 
Pacific trade and naval supremacy in support of the Monroe Doctrine, which served as 
one of the party’s cardinal principles.
10
 In their interpretation of the influential foreign 
policy, Hawaii represented the key to ensure US rights in the Pacific region and its 
national security from European or Asian encroachment. The pro-expansionists’ 
arguments tended to lack specifics and instead maintained foundations of general ideals 
rather than concrete justifications. The lack of hostilities undermined the islands’ military 
value. Furthermore, domestic agricultural aggressively argued Hawaii provided a 
negative impact upon the American economy.
11
   
The Democratic Party, in contrast, questioned the policy on multiple grounds. As 
in the previous eras, they viewed the added competition from the archipelago’s 
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agricultural businesses as a threat to domestic farming.
12
 Other members maintained 
concerns the United States needed to focus on needs within its own borders rather than 
protecting outlying territories.
13
 Additionally, they believed policies that encouraged 
expansionism violated the fundamental American policies condemning colonization 
foreign countries.
14
 In the earlier debates, the Democrats repeatedly achieved success in 
preventing annexation proposals and most commercial treaties.
15
 Such a fact should have 
caused the Harrison administration concern, but their rhetoric ignored the precedent.
16
   
The anticipation of the European and Asian powers’ possible reaction initially 
slowed the treaties advancement as American political leaders awaited the foreign 
countries’ diplomatic responses. After the coup, indications from the British minister to 
the archipelago and members of the press created alarm that the Western empires and 
Japan might respond to the Pacific nation’s upheaval by demanding the US abandon the 
kingdom.
17
 It became evident, however, that as the months passed, Europe abandoned its 
competition for influence in Hawaii. As long as the maritime powers retained access to 
the island’s ports, who controlled the government garnered little concern.
18 
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Another obstacle to the rapid progression of Harrison’s agreement emanated from 
the prevailing racism that continued to plague the nation. On both sides of the political 
aisle, many questioned the admission of a country that maintained a large population of 
non-white subjects. Laws in the US excluded Asians from the country, but in Hawaii, the 
racial groups numbered well in excess of 20,000.
19
 To accept annexation, was to accept 
them and thus undermine the protection of the Caucasian purity and job security.
20
 The 
Pacific plantation owners would not end their practice of using cheap foreign labor, as the 
Hawaiians and the Euro-Americans tended to be ill suited for the work. The impasse 
created heated debate in Congress and in the newspapers that contributed to the 
deceleration of the bill through the Senate.
21
   
Amidst the nation’s softening enthusiasm, the House introduced four resolutions, 
which called for the support of annexation.
22
 On February 4, 1893, Secretary of State 
Foster provided the provisional government’s commissioners a tentative draft related to 
the official treaty. It addressed only the basic question of whether the archipelago 
deserved annexation to the US and excluded key points requested by the envoys.
23
 The 
scaled down version emanated from his anticipation that with the session’s termination, 
the only hope of success required the omission of controversial material that might lead 
to its defeat.
24
 As a result, the administration dropped sections concerning tariff 
elimination and modified the immigration wording to state the existing islands’ labor 
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system would continue until changed by future legislation.
25
 As the terms set forth in the 
draft differed vastly from their original instructions, the American-Hawaiian 
representatives refused to accept the convention.
 26
 Because of their concerns, the issues 
the secretary hoped to avoid returned to slow the process and build opposition.
 
Exactly 
thirty-one days after the revolution started, and with less than a month left in the Fifty-
Second Congress, on February 14, 1893, the modified agreements gained the provisional 
government’s support and moved on to the president for his approval.
27
 
The revolution’s American-Hawaiian dominated narrative formed the basis of 
John Foster’s letter that accompanied the proposed treaty upon its submission to 
Benjamin Harrison. Without consulting the monarchy, the president accepted the biased 
particulars and passed the treaty to the Senate with his own assessment.
28
 Harrison stated 
he not only respected, but also encouraged, the continuance of Hawaii’s independence 
provided it ensured protection of American life and property while maintaining the 
stability to provide adequate security against domination from other powers. He denied 
involvement in the monarch’s overthrow and accused Lili’uokalani of unscrupulous 
practices that placed her country in serious peril, thus ensuring her restoration remained 
undesirable.
29
 To facilitate the treaty’s rapid progression, Harrison and Foster warned 
Congress against lengthy discussion concerning the legal, moral, or ethical aspects 
concerning the revolution or the kingdom’s admission into the United States.
30
 A day 
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after its arrival upon the president’s desk and with less than a month before the new 
administration took office, it officially advanced to the Senate.
31
  
Lili’uokalani’s letter of protest along with her mission’s arrival further slowed the 
accord’s progression. As new accounts regarding the revolution became public, an 
opinion prevailed in Congress that it remained “indispensable that both sides of the 
question should be candidly heard.”
32
 The royal narrative regarding the revolution created 
questions concerning the actions of John Stevens and the USS Boston’s officers.
33
 
Additionally, the Hawaiian delegation provided a petition signed by 3,411 qualified 
electors against the provisional government, which undermined the earlier reports the 
coup maintained the native people’s support.
34
 The commission received reinforcement 
from the arrival of the heir to the throne, Princess Kaiulani, and her distinguished 
guardian, former British minister to the archipelago, Theo H. Davies (See Picture 20). 
Kaiulani appealed to the American people to support the fallen monarchy.
35
 She 
reminded the country that for seventy years, Christians from Boston provided her 




                                                                                                                                                 
been present at the time of the provisional government took position of the government. He reiterated that 
the annexation proposal was voluntarily offered to Washington by the special commission. Tate, The 







 Cranstoun Metcalfe, “The Story of a Political Crime,” The New Century Review 4, No. 23 
(November 1898): 352; “The Annexation Treaty,” The New York Times, February 17, 1893, 8. 
32
 Liliuokalani, Hawaii's Story, 252-3; “Editorial,” The Washington Post, February 10, 1893; 
“Envoys of the Queen Bring Different Story,” New York Herald, February 10, 1893. 
33
 “Pleading for Lilly,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 20, 1893, 6. 
34
 San Francisco Morning Call, March 10, 1893; Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, 215. 
35
 “Hawaii’s Young Princess.” The Washington Post, March 9, 1893, 2. 
36





As Grover Cleveland’s presidency drew closer, he assumed increased interest in 
the Hawaiian crisis (See Picture 21). A friend of Lydia Lili’uokalani and the islands’ new 
provisional president, Stanford Dole, he maintained concerns related to the rapidity with 
which the treaty advanced through the Senate. On February 22, 1893, the president-elect 
as well as his future secretary of state, Walter Clinton Gresham, conferred regarding the 
monarch’s letter and the kingdom’s latest intelligence. Several days later, with little 
resistance from Congress, Cleveland used his influence to postpone the statute.
37
 Upon 
his assumption of office, he officially withdrew the accord and ordered a review of the 
events that led to the kingdom’s overthrow.
38
 Based upon the new president’s actions, the 
provisional government’s commission returned to the islands to await the future 
developments from an administration that maintained a history of challenging their 
political and commercial ideology.
39
  
Initially after the revolution’s announcement in January 1893, the American 
public mirrored the divisions found in Congress, however, as the monarchy’s accounts 
found publication, opposition concerning the treaty grew. On February 9, a letter written 
by Lili’uokalani’s former Minister of Interior, John F Colburn, received multiple 
publications throughout the country. Articles like the Herald’s “A Wail from Honolulu” 
and The World’s “Was Hawaii Stolen?,” both questioned the provisional government’s 
accounts relating to the coup, and accused Stevens of maintaining an active role in the 
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monarchy’s overthrow by far exceeding the scope of his official duties.
40 
The newspapers 
noted Lili’uokalani yielded not to the revolutionists, but to the United States’ superior 
forces. In later editions, the New York Post, The Nation, and The World characterized the 
kingdom’s overthrow as a revolution of sugar, by sugar, for sugar.
41
 The New York Times, 
as the new accounts of the revolution became known, cautioned against the president’s 
rush to judgment.
42
 Because of the news outlets’ changing tones, within two months 
Americans questioned the revolution’s early accounts and annexation itself.
43
  
In the face of reduced support, Lorrin Thurston and John L. Stevens openly 
attacked Lili’uokalani. They described the queen and her predecessor, King David 
Kalakaua, as semi-barbaric, vicious, and demoralizing leaders who posed a threat to the 
islands’ welfare.
44
 The attacks also extended to the Hawaiian people who, based upon the 
period’s prevailing racial thoughts, lacked their white neighbors’ intelligence and moral 
strength. Because of their commitment to Social Darwinism, the annexationists deemed 
the need for the former kingdom to continue under American control.
45
 War hawks like 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the president of the Naval War College and the author of The 
Influence of Seapower upon History, supported the provisional government.
46
 Although 
there never existed a history of aggression between the United States and China or Japan, 
he postulated that if one of the two nations gained control over the isles, American’s 
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national security remained at risk. Hawaii, Mahan publicized, served as a key naval post 
to ensure the west coast security.
47
   
On March 10, 1893, President Cleveland appointed former chairperson of the 
committee on foreign affairs, James H. Blount, as a special commissioner to Hawaii to 
assess the situation and submit recommendations regarding the United States’ response to 
the crisis (See Picture 22).
48
 The commissioner arrived in Honolulu on March 29, 1893, 
and officially relieved John Stevens of his diplomatic mission. Blount’s instructions 
stated he maintained no authority to restore the queen or to interfere with the islands’ 
domestic policies. Furthermore, the settlement of the annexation issue failed to fall within 
the scope of the official’s duties as the accord remained especially reserved for the 
president and Congress.
49
 Within days of his arrival, Blount ordered the United States 
flag lowered from the federal building and the troops re-embarked upon the cruiser 
Boston.
50
 Over the following three months, his demeanor created apprehension among 
the provisional government’s members, despite their attempts to win his favor.  
James Blount informed the president of his mission’s completion on July 17, 
1893, and provided his report to the State Department.
51
 The document, published in the 
United States Department of State’s 1894 Foreign Relations of United States, Affairs in 
Hawaii report, challenged the accounts provided by the provisional government and 
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former US minister, John Stevens.
52
 It stipulated the former minister maintained hostility 
towards Lydia Lili’uokalani based on his repeated diplomatic letters and personal actions 
while in the service of the State Department. Stevens, he claimed, failed to confine 
himself to the duties within his sphere of responsibility by when he precipitate the 
downfall of the monarchy. It concluded the troops’ deployment occurred not to protect 
American life and property, but rather to aid in the monarchy’s overthrow. The coup’s 
success resulted from the USS Boston’s forces and the provisional authority’s recognition 
before its officials established full control over the islands. As such, the commissioner 




Based upon the Blount’s report, Secretary of State Gresham recommended 
Cleveland publically acknowledge Hawaii suffered an illegal act under a US diplomat’s 
authority. He asserted Stevens’ actions required reversal and the president needed to 
recognize the islands’ sovereignty.
54
 On October 18, 1893, the new minister to Hawaii, 
Albert S. Willis, received orders to inform Lili’uokalani that annexation no longer 
remained the United States’ intention. Through Willis, the president expressed his regret 
regarding Stevens’ unauthorized deployment of US military forces to compel the 
sovereign’s surrender. Cleveland’s message assured the queen his administration 
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intended to return the monarchy to power, but required she exercise restraint towards the 
American-Hawaiian subjects who participated in the rebellion.
55
  
Grover Cleveland’s Attorney General, Richard Olney, and Secretary of Treasury 
John G. Carlisle, criticized Gresham’s policy as being impractical. They cited the 
revolution’s reversal weighed upon the use of the military to reinstate the monarchy. 
Such actions fell beyond the president’s constitutional power, as it represented an act of 
war upon a foreign country.
56
 To use force, sustained problems as the United States as 
numerous foreign powers officially recognized the provisional government and 
aggression risked the growth of instability in the Pacific nation.
57 
Additionally, the 
prosecution of individuals who served as Minister Stevens’ instruments of transformation 
promised to bring America disrepute both at home and abroad. Olney stated Hawaiian 
interests demanded the administration’s focus as it maintained “no right to redeem the 
original wrong by the commission of another still greater wrong to wit, the imposition 
upon Hawaii of the government not wanted by its people.”
58
  
To reinstate the monarchy with minimal resistance, Richard Olney persuaded 
Cleveland that Lili’uokalani needed to guarantee the safety and freedom of the coup’s 
                                                 
55
 Dole, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, 98; “Hawaii,” American Advocate of Peace 55, No. 
12 (December, 1893): 278; Walter Q. Gresham to Albert S. Willis, October 18, 1893, Morgan Report II, 
1271-2.  
56
 Gresham to Willis, December 3, 1893, Morgan Report II, 1271-2. 
57
 The United States recognized the provisional Government, and this recognition remained, 
likewise it was recognized by all the other powers Mr. Willis bore credentials to this same Government, the 
only one in the islands. It is a curious position to be in, to hold a Government in recognition, and to be 
sending ministers to it, and at the same time deliberately planning its overthrow. The administration and 
undertaking to reinstate the Queen’s government by force of arms would be open to the reproach of 
sacrificing the interests of the country and its people to the interests of the Queen’s government and her 
dynasty.” Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 240. 
58
 “Hawaii,” American Advocate of Peace 55, No. 12 (December 1893): 278; Tate, The United 





members upon their removal.
59
 Initially, the former queen declared her intention to 
follow Hawaii’s 1887 penal code, which called for individuals convicted of treason to 
face possible execution and the loss of their property. She stated the individuals in 
question facilitated the 1887 and 1893 revolutions and thus posed a continued threat to 
the kingdom’s peace.
60
 The president responded that while he deemed it his duty to 
restore the sovereign, his further efforts depended upon her unqualified agreement to 
prevent the adoption of punitive measures.
61
 On December 18, 1893, after several days of 
discussion, Minister Willis convinced Lili’uokalani to abandon her commitment to 
punish the American-Hawaiian conspirators.
62
  
A day later, Cleveland’s representative informed the provisional government’s 
president, Stanford Dole, the administration’s determination that he relinquish complete 
constitutional power to Queen Lili’uokalani.
63
 The provisional leader refused to surrender 
his authority and rejected America’s right to interfere in Hawaii’s domestic affairs. Dole 
maintained the position that if the United States illegally used its forces in the revolution, 
his administration lacked responsibility for anther nation’s mistake.
64
 Furthermore, he 
                                                 
59
 Gresham to Willis, October 18, 1893, Morgan Report II, 1271-2; “Instructions to Willis,” New 
York Times, December 19, 1893, 2. 
60
 “The United States and Hawaii,” The Times London, January 15, 1894, 5; Willis to Gresham, 
November 18, 1893, Morgan Report II, 2108-11; Mr. Willis to Mr. Gresham, November 19, 1893, Morgan 
Report II, 2112-5. 
61
 Cleveland stated the queen’s amnesty was critical in obtaining the support of congress and the 
American public. On November 7, 1883, the provisional government became aware of President 
Cleveland’s intension to abandon the annexation accord with Hawaii. The source of the intelligence 
originated from an article in the Chicago Evening Post, which reported that the queen was to be restored to 
her throne. Gresham to Willis, December 3, 1893, Morgan Report II, 1271-2; Liliuokalani, Hawaii's 
Story, 254-5.  
62
 Dole, Memoirs of the Hawaiian Revolution, 109-110; Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, 
Morgan Report II, 2115-6. 
63
 Willis to Gresham, December 20, 1893, Morgan Report II, 2116-7. 
64
 The lack of consistency regarding the former Hawaiian League’s approach to the 
implementation of democratic principles and their respect towards the United States government reveals the 
white communities true focus through the only subject they never deviated from, financial and political 





declared, Stevens’ exploits remained a private matter of discipline between the State 
Department and its officers and did not involve the members of the islands’ new 
government. Dole assured Minister Willis that Queen Liliuokalani’s return to the throne 
required the use of armed action against the new republic.
65
  
By February 1894, President Cleveland recognized the situation’s complexity by 
passing the United States’ final answer to the Hawaiian Question to Congress.
66
 
Throughout the month, both houses engaged in heated debates regarding the American 
response. The parties remained divided as the Republicans sought annexation and the 
Democrats vacillated between supporting Cleveland’s policies or committing to a 
strategy of noninterference. On February 7, the House of Representatives voted on two 
bills brought forth by Republican Henry William Blair and Democrat James B. 
McCreary. The resolution forwarded by Blair sought the islands’ appropriation, but failed 
to pass by a vote of 90 to 155.
67
 Thereafter, McCreary’s measure, which proposed 
legislation to prevent the executive branch’s interference in other countries’ government 
operations, namely Hawaii, failed to find the support it needed among his party by a vote 
of 94 to 158, with 99 abstentions.
68
 It remained clear within the House by the day’s end 
no clear direction existed among the political leaders. 
                                                 
65
 Rallies with violent tones against the US minister to Hawaii were held. Willis to Gresham, 
December 23, 1893, Morgan Report II, 2121-8. 
66
 Although the change in the executive branch represented a reversal in the countries leadership, 
the House of representative remained democratic and the Senate remained Republican. Goldwin Smith, 
“The Situation at Washington,” The Nineteenth century: A Monthly Review 34, No. 197 (July 1893): 131; 
US Congress, House, President’s Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands, December 18, 1893, House 




 Sess., (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1893), 
1251-2 (Serial Set #3224) Hereafter Hawaiian Islands; “Republicans in the Senate are Not to be Silenced,” 
New York Times, December 19, 1893, 2. 
67
 “Failed at Quorum,” Washington Post, February 7, 1893, 1. 
68
 A bill from Rep. Hitts calling for any interferences with the Hawaiian government to be 
considered an unfriendly act also failed to a vote of 102 yeas to 152 nays. “Failed at Quorum,” Washington 









On February 24, 1894, the Democratic dominated Senate presented a report from 
its Committee of Foreign Relations concerning the events surrounding Queen 
Lili’uokalani’s overthrow and the US response. Called the Morgan Report, after the 
committee’s chairperson, Democrat John T. Morgan, the majority report reversed the 
Blount investigation’s conclusions and exonerated the American officials’ actions (See 
Picture 23).
69
 It attacked Lili’uokalani along with her cabinet by claiming that upon their 
discussion to move against the 1887 constitution, they abdicated her right to lead.
70
 
Because of her illegal action, the committee members stated the foreign subjects acted in 
the Hawaiian nation’s best interest. John Stevens and Captain George C. Wiltse’s actions 
also found renewed support as the report indicated a threat existed to the white citizens 
thus warranting the troops’ deployment. The four Republicans, who maintained strong 
annexationist views, declared President Cleveland’s use of James Blount as a special 
commissioner remained unconstitutional, as he failed to acquire the Senate’s approval.
71
 
They declared the US president maintained no authority to challenge the provisional 
government’s right to rule the islands.
72
  
The committee’s endorsement of the report, like accords before it, reflected the 
divide in the country.
73
 Four Democratic dissenters within the committee submitted a 
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minority report, which disagreed with the conclusions presented by the chairman. They 
stated no irregularities occurred either in the appointment of Commissioner Blount or in 
the instructions given to him by the president. The report challenged the Morgan Report’s 
findings that Stevens’ only substantial irregularity involved his declaration the United 
States served as a protectorate over the kingdom on February 1, 1893.
74
 The four men 
maintained nothing in international law or in American tradition justified the interference 
of a government representative in a foreign country’s domestic affairs. They remained 




The American press reacted to the Morgan Report along the political lines. 
Republican leaning papers used the committee’s findings to further encourage the 
islands’ annexation. The Chicago Daily Tribune stated if one “read between the lines,” 
they would determine the report condemned Cleveland’s actions towards the American 
officials and the provisional government.
76
 Papers supportive of the Democratic platform 
ridiculed the report as repetitious and at times contradicting. The New York Times 
described the document as a “rather picturesque bit of patchwork,” while The 
Philadelphia Record called it “a mere incoherent yawp of jingoism.”
77
 
In the last week of May 1894, the Senate joined the House of Representatives in 
addressing the issue of non-interference with Hawaii. The amendment called for the 
                                                 
74
 “A Report Upon Hawaii” The Washington Post, February 27, 1894, 7. 
75
 They reaffirmed that his conduct remained reprehensible and deserving of public censure. The 
minority report signatures included Matthew C Butler, David Turpie, John W Daniel, and George Gray. 
Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 225; “A Report Upon Hawaii” The Washington Post, 
February 27, 1894, 7. 
76
 “The Morgan Hawaiian Report,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 28, 1894, 6; Grover’s 
Props Gone,” The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 27, 1894, 3.  
77
 “Hawaii in the Senate,” The Philadelphia Record, February 28, 1984, 4; “Various Views as to 
Hawaii: Reports from the Committee of the Senate,” The New York Times, February 27, 1894, 6; Cong. 









United States to maintain neutrality and passed by a vote of 55 to 0, with 30 
abstentions.
78
 As the debate faded, Washington abandoned its assurances to reinstate the 
monarchy and for the fourth time in American diplomatic history, Hawaii’s annexation 
failed to find support.
79
 On July 4, 1894, the archipelago’s interim leadership established 
itself as the independent Republic of Hawaii.
80
 Cleveland’s administration provided the 
islands with renewed economic hope when it signed into law the Wilson-Gorman Tariff 
Act of 1894. The act abolished the sugar bounty and reduced the tariff on sugar 
importation that permitted the republic to regain its original advantageous position under 
the reciprocity treaty nullified by the McKinley Tariffs.
81
  
On January 24, 1895, a resolution by Senator William V. Allen, a Populist from 
Nebraska, revived the Hawaiian debate through a pro-annexation measure. George 
Graham of Missouri countered the resolution with a bill that reaffirmed the policy of 
absolute non-interference and recognized the right of a country to maintain its own form 
of government. By a vote of 24 to 22, with 36 abstentions, Graham’s resolution passed. 
For the second time in less than a year, the Senate supported a policy of neutrality in the 
Pacific.
82
 Over the following year, the question concerning the archipelago faded from 
public debate as the United States deemed the country outside its sphere of interest.   
As the 1896 presidential campaign gained momentum, the subject of annexation 
returned to the American debate.
83
 The previous four years demonstrated the majority of 
the public and its representatives failed to support US interventionism, but lacked the 
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commitment to undo former minister John Stevens’ actions. Although the pro-
expansionists repeatedly suffered defeats, their personal drive far exceeded their 
opposition’s passion and eventually gained the required advantage. Prominent 
Republicans like Theodore Roosevelt and William E. Russell asserted Hawaii remained a 
critical component in the construction of a first-class fighting navy.
84
 The failure to 
commandeer the islands, they stated, represented a crime against the United States and 
white civilization.
85
 To signal its support, on May 27, the Hawaiian legislature 




The Republican Party’s success in 1896, with the election of President William 
McKinley served as a hopeful sign among the jubilant annexationists (See Picture 24). 
The renewed potential towards becoming a United States’ territory promised to prevent 
two major concerns the new government maintained. The first involved what the new 
administration thought constituted a covert attempt by the Japanese to claim the islands 
through mounting immigration, absorption of trade, and pressure to recognize the rights 
of Tokyo’s nationalists in the archipelago.
87
 The second problem involved increased 
anxiety over the possible reinstatement of American tariffs.
88
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Eight days after his inauguration, President McKinley discussed with former 
secretary of state, John Foster, and Maine’s senator, William P. Frye, the general features 
of an annexation treaty and the question of whether the subject should be initiated as a 
formal accord or joint resolution.
89
 Although the new administration supported 
annexation, it remained clear there existed substantial opposition within the country. 
McKinley, without a clear victory, abandoned the treaty to pursue domestic affairs over 
foreign issues. However, when the minister of Hawaii presented the secretary of state an 
unofficial communication regarding the republic’s desire to renew negotiations towards 
the two nations union, William McKinley resumed his exploration of Hawaii’s 
annexation.
 90
 In May 1897, the president appointed expansionist William Rufus Day as 
the first assistant secretary of state.
91
 With John W. Foster’s help, the State Department 
prepared a treaty draft on June 16 that went to the Senate with McKinley’s approval.
92
 In 
his message, the president indicated the union provided protection for the islands and the 
US from Asian expansion.
93
  
When Senator John Morgan introduced Senate Bill 2263 to provide for and 
regulate the archipelago’s appropriation as a territory on June 23, 1897, two groups 
responded with strong opposition. The first and most powerful lobby remained the 
American Sugar Trust.
94
 As before, they feared the islands’ sugar industry posed a threat 
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to the trust’s monopoly on US domestic sugar production and distribution.
95
 Between 
December 1897 and July 9, 1898, numerous states, companies, and unions involved with 
the sugar industry filed petitions against the annexation treaty.
96
 Ironically, the former 
advocate of Hawaiian sugar, Claus Spreckels, became a leading opponent against the 
republic and wielded great influence in preventing the accord.
97
    
Between September 11 and October 2, 1897, the second group, Hui Aloha Aina 
(Patriotic League of the Hawaiian Islands), organized a mass petition drive that collected 
21,269 native voter signatures in opposition the islands’ annexation.
98 
The document 
served as evidence against the haole government’s assurances that its population 
supported union with the United States.
99
 In December, Lili'uokalani and four delegates, 
with the 556-page plea in hand, met with Senator George Hoar, the Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to present its text to the Senate. The next day the 
delegation met with Secretary of State John Sherman to submit their formal protest.
100
 
With their mission’s completion, the delegates left Washington on February 27, 1898, 
confident that with only forty-six senators willing to vote for appropriation, the treaty 
remained defeated in the Senate as it lacked the required two-thirds majority.
101
 
                                                 
95
 Coffman, Nation Within, 232-5; “On Annexation,” Pacific Commercial Advertiser, May 19, 
1897, 1; “Sugar Trust Fighting Hawaii,” Chicago Daily Tribune, February 2, 1898, 6. 
96
 Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian Kingdom, 292. 
97
 Coffman, Nation Within, 233-4. 
98
 This equated to more than half the 39,000 native Hawaiians and mixed-blood persons reported 
by the Hawaiian Commission census for the same year. Tate, The United States and the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, 267. 
99





 Sess., S45. 
100
 “Protest Against Annexation,” The Washington Post, December 11, 1897, 4; 
Liliuokalani, Hawaii's Story, 364. 
101






On February 15, 1898, the annexationists gained a compelling argument in 
support of Hawaii’s annexation. The deaths of 266 sailors from an explosion that ripped 
through the USS Maine while anchored in Havana Harbor motivated the United States’ 
on April 25, to declare war against the Spanish Empire. The American strategy called for 
the mobilization against enemy assets in the Caribbean and Pacific Ocean.
102
 Because the 
modern steam powered naval ships averaged operational range of approximately 3,000 
nautical miles, campaigns along the Asian continent required a station to replenish their 
coal reserves. With Spain’s territories in the Philippines and Guam, Hawaii looked to 
become a key military asset to the US Navy.
103
 The consensus among the Foreign 
Relations Committee, however, held that the required two-thirds majority remained a 
distant possibility despite the Spanish conflict’s positive effect upon the debate.
104
 
Instead, Republicans decided to attempt to bring about the annexation through a joint 
resolution, following the precedent set with Texas’ appropriation in 1845.
105
  
Within two weeks of the war initiation, Commodore George Dewey achieved a 
decisive naval victory in the Philippine’s Manila Bay. His success served as another 
boost to the pro-expansionists, who now championed Hawaii’s importance towards the 
war effort.
106
 With American control over the Philippines, Pearl Harbor afforded the US 
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Navy full reach of its new territory and the Asian continent.
107
 Carried by the momentum 
of the victory, shortly after the battle the House of Representatives introduced House 
Resolution 259, which called for the annexation of the Pacific republic.
108
 Throughout the 
debates that waged for an additional month, the demands of the United States Naval 
forces remained the expansionists’ primary motivation. The bill’s supporters cited a 
perceived Japanese threat and the need to protect the continent’s west coast. Admiral 
John J. Walker informed Congress the cheapest way to defend the US involved Hawaii’s 
fortification.
109
 Arkansas Senator Hugh Anderson Dinsmore countered the naval 
argument with the declaration that the US never existed as a “colonial nation.”
110
 On June 
15, the debate ended as the islands’ appropriation as a territory gained limited 
government support by a vote of 209 to 91.
111
 The joint resolution transferred to the 
Senate the following day to face its final hurdle.
112
  
Upon its arrival, the resolution received heated debate from Democrats 
concerning the legality of Queen Lili’uokalani’s overthrow, the ethics of imperialism, 
and the cost of maintaining the islands as a territory. The pro-annexationists resurrected 
their likeminded representatives’ argument regarding Pearl Harbor’s military importance, 
and stated that right or wrong, the war overruled the ethical considerations. On July 6, the 
Senate voted down resolutions to implemented new leadership in the Pacific nation and 
allow the Hawaiian population to vote on their country’s annexation. The next day the 
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bill granting the appropriation of the Hawaiian Islands passed with 42 in favor, 21 
opposed, and 26 abstentions.
113
 In the end, the sovereignty’s collapse resulted from less 
than half of the total senators, as two thirds either voted against the bill, or did not vote at 
all.
114
   
On July 8, 1898, President McKinley signed the resolution ending the five-decade 
annexation question forever.
115
 A week later word arrived in Hawaii that it constituted a 
United States’ territory. The islands’ pro-business newspapers celebrated, while the ali’i 
and the kanaka loyal to their monarchy watched their independence crumble. For the 
common people, the loss maintained little effect upon their lives, but for the former 
native elite, the monarchy‘s collapse equated to a further reduction of  their privileged 
state as the royalty no longer maintained value in the islands.
116
 The Republic’s official 
transfer to the United States occurred on August 12, 1898, the same day that hostilities 
ended with Spain through the signing of the Protocol of Peace. Once again, the 
celebration reflected the isles’ divide as few Native Hawaiians attended the official 
ceremony.
117
 At noon, as Lydia Lili’uokalani and her supporters remained in self-
instituted seclusion, the Hawaiian flag descended from the Iolani Palace while the Royal 
Hawaiian Band played the Hawaiian national anthem, Hawaiʻi Ponoʻi. Seconds later, as 
the American national anthem played the Stars and Stripes rose above the Hawaii’s seat 
of power (See Picture 24).
118
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A number of factors associated with the annexationists’ rhetoric justifying 
Hawaii’s appropriation raise serious questions as to the treaty’s legitimacy. The first 
major issue involved the Hawaiian provisional government and, its later incarnation, the 
Republic of Hawaii’s questionable authority over the native people who constituted the 
majority of the populace. Their multiple evasions of the established Hawaiian 
Constitutions and Lydia Lili’uokalani’s numerous petitions demonstrated that a union 
with the United States failed to embody her former subjects’ popular interests. Secondly, 
the American expansionist minded politicians who used the dubious revolt to their 
advantage also failed to obtain a clear understanding whether or not the majority of 
Hawaiian citizens or residents supported the annexation of their country. Furthermore, 
President McKinley’s circumvention of the constitutional process that governed the 
annexation of foreign territories and the Republican’s manipulation of the Spanish-
American War contributed to the modern narrative that considers Hawaii’s collapse to the 
exertion of US imperialism. The contemporary account, however, fails to address the 
complexities that 1893 uprising created for President Cleveland’s attempts to return the 
queen to her throne. In retrospect, there remained little the United States could do to 







In 1835, fifteen years after their arrival in the archipelago, fifty members of the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions worked to bring Christianity 
and Western culture to the nearly 100,000 Hawaiians spread across eight islands.
1
 
Representing less than 1 percent of the permanent population, the missionaries garner 
blame and praise for the extensive controversial transformations, which westernized the 
archipelago.
2
 As of 1860, disease and poor living conditions reduced the number of 
natives to 66,984, while the Western residents numbered 1,600. By 1890, three years 
before the revolution, 40,622 Hawaiians shared their kingdom with 7,498 haole residents 
amidst political and racial conflict.
3
 Based upon the census data, the Anglo-American 
population never exceeded one-third of the total population.
4
 Additionally, their minority 
status within the Pacific society remained consistent with their representation within the 
political system. The Western subjects throughout the nineteenth century never exceeded 
30 percent of the voting population or gained a majority of either house. Considering 
their limited numbers and their lack of foreign military or political support, the 
missionaries and their dependents lacked the power to force the native people to assume 
changes they thought inappropriate. 
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2
 The missionaries maintained strong opposition from the Euro-American merchants, sailors, and 
whalers critical of their social agenda. These evangelical families also gained resistance from the 
representatives from England and France. 
3
 Charles T. Rodgers, Report of the General Superintendent of the Census, 1890 (Honolulu: R. 
Grieve Printer, 1891), 13; US Bureau of Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States Taken in the Year 
1910: Statistics Hawaii Containing Statistics of Population, Agriculture, Manufactures, and Mining ... 
Reprint of the Supplement ... Published in Connection with the Abstract of the Census, vol. 2. (Washington, 
DC: US Government Printing Office, 1913), 6. 
4
 The missionaries’ authoritarian ideology that drove their religious views also shaped their 





As such, the responsibility for the Hawaiian society’s transformation rests upon 
not only the Boston evangelicals and their descendants, but also the monarchs and their 
ali’i. The complete and sustained abandonment of a long established culture within a 
century seems impossible without the native leaders’ corroboration. As the modifications 
brought little, if any benefit to the kingdom’s commoners, the new social and political 
systems intended to further the personal aggrandizement of the elite class.
5
 Although the 
leadership thought they were capable of manipulating the former evangelicals for their 
advantage, the monarchy’s inexperience with Western business practices and laws 
allowed for critical lapses in judgment. This afforded the haole to imbed themselves deep 
into Hawaii’s economic structures. Furthermore, with each privilege the kingdom 
afforded their new subjects, the former missionaries’ commitment to Social Darwinian 
ideology caused them to view the gift as an acknowledgement of their racial superiority. 
By the mid-nineteenth century, it remained clear that the early monarchs and the ali’i 
made a foolish pact with a devil dressed in Christian clothing.  
The numerous conflicts that occupied the Anglo-American nations throughout the 
first thirty years of the 1800s provided the newly established kingdom with a freedom 
often denied for lands that encountered the Western maritime powers. Despite two 
incidences triggered by French and British naval officers, the archipelago continued their 
right to self-determination until 1893. The multiple failed attempts by the monarchy to 
formally align themselves with Great Britain or the United States reveal the Western 
nation’s unwillingness to assume responsibility for the islands, especially when they 
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maintained full access to its numerous facilities. Moreover, at a time when numerous 
Pacific islands remained under European rule, Hawaii’s Anglo subjects remained under 
the monarchy’s authority and direction.
6
 The lack of foreign interference further 
demonstrates the independence of the former missionaries turned businessmen, and their 
dependence upon the native leaders to further their personal agendas.  
The short reigns of the Kamehameha family’s last two kings attempted to alter the 
dynamics that governed the relationship between the kingdom, its foreign subjects, and 
the United States. Although the monarchs’ policies sought to strengthen their rule by 
reducing the white community’s influence, especially after the American Civil War, it 
exposed long simmering sentiments of anxiety and aggression. As the haoles became 
increasingly insubordinate, the racial and political divide assumed an antagonistic nature. 
Under such conditions of mutual distrust and contempt, the relationship’s latent 
dysfunction became overt, resulting in open discourse among the multi-ethnic elite class. 
By the end of 1869, the power the Anglo-American subjects retained over the economy 
prevented their removal without jeopardizing the nation’s financial system and in-turn the 
society as a whole.
7
 Conversely, despite the businessmen’s contempt for the Hawaiian 
people, the lack of support from the United States and their minority status in the islands 
required them to honor the native government’s authority. As neither side held the 
advantage over the other, the relationship between the privileged haoles and former ali’i 
continued despite its growing instability as neither side maintained an advantage over the 
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other. As long as the union between the two groups brought profit, their differences could 
be overlooked.  
However, the reign of King David Kalākaua eventually threatened that prosperity 
leading to the fragile relationship’s collapse. The period’s sources indicate the monarch 
was an opportunist who ineptly attempted to manipulate both the native majority and the 
Anglo-American minority. The treasury’s near bankruptcy, the king’s associations to 
shady businessmen, and his self-aggrandizement not only upset the Western subjects who 
represented the financial institutions, but also the Hawaiian people who grew ostracized 
under his leadership. The parliament’s legislators seemed to represent the only group 
benefiting from the crisis as they appeared to profit from the flow of bribes throughout 
the government. At a time when the kingdom needed effective political and economic 
leaders, their shared corruption, greed, and intense animosity towards each other 
exasperated the islands’ racial and ideological schism.  
Kalākaua’s unpopularity among the native populace finds additional 
substantiation through the parliament’s response to the 1887 Bayonet Constitution. 
Although the legislature preserved its ability to replace the cabinet, six years passed 
before the revolutionaries lost their positions of power. Their inaction concerning the 
king’s suppression by the foreign minority establishes two strong implications. The first 
indicates that many in the native controlled political system benefited from the League’s 
influence in the kingdom’s affairs in one form or another. David Kalākaua, secondly, 
remained unpopular among the white and non-white populace, as the Wilcox Revolution 





Whether through government sanction or birth, the privileged white community 
remained long-standing subjects who sustained extensive financial investments in the 
local economy. As such, despite their skin color, they maintained the right to actively 
participate in the political process. Nonetheless, the Hawaiian League’s desire to guide 
the legislature’s course displayed fantastical thinking. They mistakenly assumed their 
business interests demanded supplementary representation and their failure to control the 
kingdom’s policies reflected discrimination rather than their minority status among the 
total population. The haole subject’s use of force to circumvent the established 
constitution in1887 displayed their lack of commitment to the democratic processes 
established by their fathers.  
The pro-revolutionary accounts regarding the 1893 uprising drew parallels 
between the character of Queen Lydia Lili’uokalani and her late brother, David Kalākaua. 
The provisional government claimed the insurrection represented the continued battle 
against monarchal corruption and racial discrimination against the white business 
community. Such rhetoric failed to acknowledge the Bayonet Constitution’s success in 
reducing the sovereign’s role in the political system. Populated by the same men who 
forcibly replaced Kalākaua’s cabinet, the queen’s ministry maintained the true power and 
thus the brunt of responsibility for the kingdom’s state.
8
 The news articles indicate that 
their displeasure with Lili’uokalani surfaced only after she challenged their authority and 
displayed the strength her brother lacked. In reality, the queen maintained a greater 
respect and commitment to the rule of law and the fundamentals of democracy than the 
men that sought her elimination.  
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The major difference between the revolution during King Kalākaua’s reign and 
the coup against Queen Lili’uokalani resides in United States Minister to Hawaii John L. 
Stevens. His support of the haole subjects transformed a domestic conflict into an 
international incident. As a diplomatic officer, he maintained the authority to direct the 
USS Boston to deploy its troops in the event the local government requested their 
presence or American lives remained in danger. It is clear these issues failed to exist at 
the time he ordered their landing in Honolulu and as such, his intervention fell outside his 
duties’ prevue. Furthermore, without his support, the revolutionaries lacked the political 
or military advantage required to successfully challenge their government. Unfortunately, 
Steven’s authority provided him the freedom to exert military force without the US 
president’s authorization. During the 1800s, the lack of immediate communications 
created delays in a government’s reactions to foreign events. On average, a message from 
Honolulu to Washington, DC took sixteen days to cross the Pacific Ocean and the 
American continent. The distance rendered it impossible for the US to sustain real time 
information and thus, diplomatic representatives retained limited power to act 
independently based upon their administration’s foreign policies.  
Although Stevens’ exploits reflected an individual perusing a personal agenda 
without government support, his position as a US diplomatic agent and his use of the 
USS Boston drew his reluctant country into the domestic conflict, despite the United 
States’ previous policies.
9
 The division between revolution and American imperialism 
further faded with the hasty response of President Harrison to the coup. His 
administration’s attempt to force the former kingdom’s annexation through the Senate 
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before his term ended raises questions as to his involvement in the coup. However, by all 
indications, he failed to maintain a policy that supported the monarchy’s collapse.    
American support remained critical to the provisional government’s Grant 
Strategy, which derived from the unofficial or mistaken advice provided by President 
Grant decades before. Their uprising required not only the monarchy’s fall, but also US 
intervention to ensure that their power would remain intact in the event that the native 
leadership gained popular support. The 1887 revolt served as a warning that their 
influence lacked permanence, especially amidst growing Hawaiian discord. The rapid 
transfer of power to the United States remained the only guarantee for their long-term 
supremacy. Additionally, the pursuit of annexation remained the only answer to their 
shrinking profits in the face of the McKinley tariffs. However, the American response 
was all, but guaranteed as indicated by the Harrison Administration’s failure to secure the 
Hawaiian-American annexation treaty, in 1893.
10
  
The uncertainty of the Hawaiian League’s strategy was further demonstrated by 
President Grover Cleveland’s attempts to return the monarchy to power. For the native 
people, unfortunately, the president attempts to undo the former US minister’s actions 
met with numerous legal, moral, and political obstacles. The first hurtle Lili’uokalani and 
Cleveland needed to overcome related to the European and Asian nations’ recognition of 
the provisional government’s legitimacy and thus their authority over the Hawaiians.
11
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 Here again, the Modern-Hawaiian Narrative flounders as these realities conflict with 
imperialism’s classical definition. The term describes a country exerting political, commercial, or military 
force upon a territory to exploit its resources, but that was not possible or desirable among the US 
population in 1893. Bailey, “The United States and Hawaii,” 560. 
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 Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Japan, and China all recognized the provisional government 
as well as the Republic of Hawaii. This demonstrates the international community’s displeasure with the 
Hawaiian monarchy and their support of the pro-business government. Foreign letters of Recognition of the 





Secondly, the revolution’s domestic origins prevented the United States from legally 
interfering in its affairs. To act against the coup d’état members constituted a declaration 
of war against not only an independent nation, but also American citizens. Consequently, 
the exertion of military strength against the Republic of Hawaii risked both domestic and 
international discord.
12
 As such, Cleveland’s failure to return the monarchy to power 
failed to constitute the US desire to appropriate the islands, but illustrated the problem’s 
extreme complexity.  
During William McKinley’s election, the Republican Party returned the Hawaiian 
Question to the political debate as a part of their platform, but it maintained little 
connection with the people who populated the discourse’s namesake. It instead reflected 
the national conversation regarding the United States’ progression as an international 
power. Without congress and the public’s popular support, McKinley’s initial policies 
towards Hawaii remained nothing more than a personal aspiration, until the Spanish-
American War brought a unique moment of opportunity. The annexation’s failure in the 
senate as a formal treaty, demonstrated the Democratic Party’s hesitation to become an 
imperialistic nation. If not for the war’s boost to American nationalism, and the strong 
republican representation in the House of Representatives, the pro-expansionists seemed 
certain to fail once again. In the end, the appropriation succeeded not by a popular policy 
that embraced imperialism, but the fortune of the expansionist over their opponents’ 
apathy or unwillingness to challenge a war time measure. This distinction fails to absolve 
the United States from its role in the insurgency as a responsibility is assigned not just to 
action, but inaction as well.  
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In the race to assign blame, the primary interpretations fail to acknowledge the 
transformation that drove Hawaii from its ancient culture was not a crime against the 
people, but rather the normal, and at times turbulent, process of cultural interactions. The 
events that constituted the overthrow of Queen Lydia Lili’uokalani and the cessation of 
the islands’ sovereignty five years later reveal the social, political, and economic 
complexities that created the turbulent relationship between the native elite and the 
kingdom’s American-Hawaiian subjects. Based upon ethnocentric distrust that created a 
divide among its political and economic systems, the society’s collapse was based not on 
if it would happen, but rather when. Although the conflict originated in the 1820s, the 
former missionaries’ Social Darwinism ideology, King David Kalākaua’s corrupt reign, 
and the tariffs the United States imposed upon Hawaiian goods, served as the key stresses 
that instigated the dual uprisings. The diversity of the multi-national agents and their 
motivations blurred the line between the dysfunctional society’s predictable failure and 
the illegal exertion of US imperialism upon a foreign nation. As such, those responsible 
consist of the leadership of the monarchy, its American subjects, and the United States 
government. The only true victims, as with most global historical narratives, remained 
the islands’ kanaka who the privileged classes’ ignored in the attempt to elevate their 
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Picture 4: One of the original missionary families, Asa and Sarah Thurston. 
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Picture 23: Queen Lydia Lili'uokalani 
 




Picture 14: The members of the Annexation Club 
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Picture 15: US Minister to Hawaii John L. Stevens 
 
Source: "John L. Stevens." Viennahistoricalsociety. Accessed September 23, 2014. 
http://www.viennahistoricalsociety.com/John_L.html. 
 
Picture 16: The United States cruiser USS Boston. 
 








Picture 17: American troops outside the Iolani Palace. 
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Picture 18: The disarming of the Royal Guard. 
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Picture 23: Alabama Senator John T. Morgan 
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Picture 25: The lowering of the Hawaiian flag from the Iolani Palace at the annexation ceremony. 
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Picture 26: Newspaper political cartoons that display the racism towards the Hawaiian people. Note the 
similarity with African depictions. 
  
Source: Hawai'i Digital Newspaper Project, Google, https://sites.google.com/a/hawaii.edu/ndnp-









Picture 27: A newspaper editorial that displays the annexation of Hawaii and its relationship to the earlier 
revolution. 
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